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Is the Sky the Limit? 
PATENT IMPLICATIONS OF DISCOVERIES MADE IN 
OUTER SPACE 
Max Stul Oppenheimer† 
INTRODUCTION: THE PATENT CHALLENGE OF SPACE EXPLORATION 
It has been less than a century since space flight was the 
province of science fiction.1 Sixty years ago, space flight was the 
province of a few advanced nations2 and manned space exploration 
remained the province of science fiction3; fifty years ago, manned 
 
 † Princeton University, B.S. cum laude; Harvard Law School, J.D.; Professor, 
University of Baltimore School of Law. 
 1 In 1920, under the title “A Severe Strain on Credulity” the New York Times 
ridiculed Dr. Robert Hutching Goddard’s proposal to launch a rocket capable of reaching the 
moon. See A Severe Strain on Credulity, N.Y. TIMES: TOPICS OF THE TIMES (Jan. 13, 1920), 
https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1920/01/13/102738081.pdf [https://
perma.cc/GEK7-CZWF]. “[A]fter the rocket quits our air . . . its flight would be neither 
accelerated nor maintained by the explosion of the charges it then might have left. To claim 
that it would be is to deny a fundamental law of dynamics and only Dr. Einstein and his 
chosen dozen . . . are licensed to do that.” Id. The New York Times published what might 
be considered a retraction in 2001—nearly thirty years after a rocket, employing Dr. 
Goddard’s design, landed on the moon. See Tom Kuntz, 150th Anniversary: 1851–2001; The 
Facts That Got Away, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/14/
news/150th-anniversary-1851-2001-the-facts-that-got-away.html [https://perma.cc/R58U-
D9QA]. In addition, the U. S. government paid $1 million to settle suits alleging 
infringement of Dr. Goddard’s U. S. patents 2,395,113 (“method for feeding combustion 
liquids to rocket apparatus”), and 2,397,657 and 2,397,659 (“control mechanism for a rocket 
apparatus”). Frequently Asked Questions About Dr. Robert H. Goddard, CLARK UNIVERSITY 
http://www2.clarku.edu/research/archives/goddard/faq.cfm [https://perma.cc/9FX4-R5AV]. 
 2 Sputnik I, the first rocket to achieve low earth orbit, was launched by the 
Soviet Union in 1957; the United States followed with its own low earth orbit rocket in 
1958. Steven J. Dick, 50 Years of NASA History, NASA (May 28, 2008) https://
www.nasa.gov/50th/50th_magazine/historyLetter.html [https://perma.cc/GL5Y-BRFA]. 
 3 The first human would not reach space until Yuri Gagarin flew the Soviet 
Union’s Vostok I in a single orbit around the Earth in 1961. See Paul D. Spudis, Lunar 
Exploration: Past and Future, NASA, https://www.nasa.gov/50th/50th_magazine/lunar
Exploration.html [https://perma.cc/466G-VGEW]; The Flight of Vostok 1, EUROPEAN 
SPACE AGENCY, https://www.esa.int/About_Us/Welcome_to_ESA/ESA_history/50_years_
of_humans_in_space/The_flight_of_Vostok_1 [https://perma.cc/8KDE-SML3]. At that 
time, Arthur C. Clarke’s “Sentinel of Eternity” had been published, but was still a decade 
away from being brought to the movie screen as Stanley Kubrick’s classic “2001: A Space 
Odyssey.” See Arthur C. Clarke, Sentinel of Eternity, TEN STORY FANTASY, Spring 1951; 
2001: A SPACE ODYSSEY (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc., 1968). 
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lunar exploration was a stunning achievement;4 ten years ago, 
human space travel was the exclusive realm of governments,5 only 
three of which maintained any kind of sustained presence in space.6 
Today, private companies have launched human space flights7 and 
orbital rockets that carry experiments and cargo to the International 
Space Station (ISS),8 while NASA’s New Horizons mission has gone 
beyond the known planets and on New Year’s Day 2019 reached 
Ultima Thule, an object 4 billion miles from our sun.9 
In the next ten years, private companies plan to reach the 
moon and planets,10 while NASA is developing a plan to land 
 
 4 See Vic Lang’at Jr., Which Countries Have Been on the Moon?, WORLD ATLAS 
(Dec. 12, 2018) https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/which-countries-have-been-on-the-
moon.html [https://perma.cc/AC5X-YHBE]. In 1969, the United States was the first 
nation to land a human (Neil Armstrong) on the moon and is still the only nation to have 
done so. Brian Dunbar, The Moon, NASA (Apr. 26, 2019), https://www.nasa.gov/moon 
[https://perma.cc/5A43-E9EL].  
 5 In all, only 12 men have walked on the moon and no one has reached another 
planet. For a list of lunar astronauts, see Nancy Atkinson, How Many People Have Walked 
on the Moon, UNIVERSE TODAY (Aug. 1, 2013), https://www.universetoday.com/55512/how-
many-people-have-walked-on-the-moon/ [https://perma.cc/LPD3-7T8A]. The first 
nongovernmental spaceflight did not occur until June 21, 2004. Tim Sharp, SpaceShipOne: 
The First Private Spacecraft, SPACE (Mar. 5, 2019), https://www.space.com/16769-
spaceshipone-first-private-spacecraft.html [https://perma.cc/ZXG6-HZLQ]. 
 6 The Soviet Union maintained the Mir space station, the U.S. maintained the 
Skylab space station (now maintained jointly as the International Space Station), and 
China maintained the Tiangong space station. See Deborah Bloom & Kate Hunt, China 
Launches Tiangong-2 Space Lab, CNN (Sept. 25, 2016, 2:25 PM), https://www.cnn.com/
2016/09/15/asia/china-launches-tiangong-2-space-lab/index.html [https://perma.cc/ZM4D-
8HTA]; Elizabeth Howell, Skylab: First U.S. Space Station, SPACE (July 11, 2018), https://
www.space.com/19607-skylab.html [https://perma.cc/5BNW-LRST]; China’s Shenzhou 11 
Docks at Tiangong 2 Space Station, BBC NEWS (Oct.19, 2016), www.bbc.com/news/world-
asia-china-37700404 [https://perma.cc/YZ8A-KV9Z]; NASA, International Cooperation, https://
www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/cooperation/index.html [https://perma.cc/7BBN-64C6]. 
 7 The private company SpaceShipOne launched a suborbital flight in 2004, 
enabling it to win the X Prize. Dan Brekke, SpaceShipOne Back on Course, WIRED (July 
7, 2004, 11:09 AM), https://www.wired.com/2004/07/spaceshipone-back-on-course/ 
[https://perma.cc/8YWS-XSUY]; Launching a New Space Industry, ANSARI XPRIZE, 
https://ansari.xprize.org/ [https://perma.cc/DJ6P-QWKV]. 
 8 In 2012, SpaceX became the first private company to deliver cargo to the ISS and 
has launched 16 resupply missions to the ISS. Dragon Resupply Mission (CRS-16), SPACEX 
(Jan. 14, 2019), https://www.spacex.com/news/2018/12/05/dragon-resupply-mission-crs-16 
[https://perma.cc/QWP8-ALKA]; Press Release, NASA, Release 14-256 NASA Chooses 
American Companies to Transport U.S. Astronauts to International Space Station (Sept. 16, 
2014), https://www.nasa.gov/press/2014/september/nasa-chooses-american-companies-
to-transport-us-astronauts-to-international [https://perma.cc/8N4D-Z3HH]. 
 9 Kenneth Chang, Snowman-like Photos of Ultima Thule Sent Home by NASA’s 
New Horizon Spacecraft, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 2, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/02/
science/ultima-thule-pictures-new-horizons.html [https://perma.cc/8XPF-8QLV]. 
 10 Leonard David, Will Commercial Space Travel Blast Off in 2014?, SPACE 
(Jan. 11, 2014, 10:00 AM), https://www.space.com/24249-commercial-space-travel-
blasts-off-2014.html [https://perma.cc/3P76-A9LD]; see also Alan Boyle, Jeff Bezos Lifts 
Curtain on Blue Origin Rocket Factory, Lays Out Grand Plan for Space Travel That 
Spans Hundreds of Years, GEEKWIRE (Mar. 8 2016, 7:58 PM), https://
www.geekwire.com/2016/jeff-bezos-lifts-curtain-blue-origin-rocket-factory-vision-space/ 
[https://perma.cc/62C8-B3NW]. See generally Elizabeth Howell, SpaceX: First Private 
Flights to Space Station, SPACE (Feb. 27, 2017), https://www.space.com/18853-
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humans on Mars by the 2030s,11 with the first step planned for 2020 
when an unmanned craft is to be sent into deep space to retrieve an 
asteroid and push it into lunar orbit for study.12 
While perhaps only a footnote in this story of incredible 
scientific achievement, the evolution of space travel has implications 
for law in general and patent law in particular.13 The possibility of 
discovering useful materials or technology in outer space was 
recognized early in the space era,14 but the patent law consequences 
of such discoveries have not been addressed completely. 
In 1984, Congress recognized the private economic potential 
of space and set out to regulate it in the Commercial Space Launch 
Act, whose purposes included “promot[ing] economic growth and 
entrepreneurial activity through use of the space environment for 
peaceful purposes.”15 In the relatively brief period since space travel 
has become feasible,16 patent law has also been modified to solve 
many of the new problems posed by the possibility of economic 
activity and technological development in outer space.17 Other 
 
spacex.html [https://perma.cc/H259-9SGS] (outlining SpaceX corporation’s plans for 
commercial space travel). 
 11 Gary Daines, NASA’s Journey to Mars, NASA (Aug. 7, 2017), https://
www.nasa.gov/content/nasas-journey-to-mars [https://perma.cc/4Q2M-97KS]; Amy Klamper, 
White House Panel Spells Out Human Spaceflight Options for NASA, SPACE (Sept. 8, 2009, 
8:01 PM EDT), http://www.space.com/7255-white-house-panel-spells-human-spaceflight-
options-nasa.html [https://perma.cc/UZD7-NVCR]. 
 12 Daines, supra note 11. 
 13 There are three types of patents issued by the United States government. 
“Patents issued under § 161 are referred to as ‘plant patents,’ which are distinguished 
from § 101 utility patents and § 171 design patents.” J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer 
Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 133 n.5 (2001). While it is conceivable that space 
exploration will discover new plants that might raise issues similar to those discussed, 
the focus of this article is on utility patent issues; the term “patent” will refer to utility 
patents unless specifically stated otherwise. 
 14 In a 1959 article, Wolf Haber proposed a model space treaty which included 
a provision that “[t]he contracting States recognize that space and celestial matter are 
potential sources of raw materials . . . . They, therefore, undertake to develop these 
potentials in concert for the common good of mankind.” Wolf Haber, A Draft Convention 
on International Law of Space, 38 MICH. ST. B. J. 24, 25 (1959). 
 15 Commercial Space Launch Act, Pub. L. No. 98-575, 98 Stat. 3055, 3055 
(1984) (codified as amended at 51 U.S.C. § 50901(b)(1) (2012 & Supp. V 2017). 
 16 In comparison, English common law dates back nearly one thousand years. 
JOHN LANGBEIN, RENÉE LETTOW & BRUCE SMITH, HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW: THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 4 (2d ed. 2009); ROSCOE 
POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 5 (1921); Mary Ann Glendon, Andrew D.E. 
Lewis, & Albert Roland Kiralfy, Common Law, ENCYC. BRITANNICA (July 26, 2018), 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/common-law [https://perma.cc/CR4D-385N] (dating 
the common law from the Norman conquest of England in 1066). 
 17 While the concept of outer space is probably intuitive, it is helpful to define 
the dividing line between the application of “terrestrial”—or traditional territorial—law 
and the application of “space law”. A helpful set of definitions is provided in an article 
from the dawn of the space age: 
“Space” is that area immediately above airspace and extending outward from 
the surface of the earth to infinity, and which surrounds all celestial 
matter. . . . “Airspace” is that area immediately superjacent to the earth, which 
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problems remain to be resolved, new problems will arise, and even 
those problems that appear to have been solved have yet to face the 
test of practical application. This article focuses on one effect of the 
emergence of extraterrestrial activity from the exclusive and 
occasional realm of government activity to the possible realm of 
everyday private activity: the impact on the definition of prior art 
under patent law, which in turn has an impact on patentability of 
inventions (both those made in outer space and those made on 
Earth) and the extent to which the benefits of activities in space can 
be imported to earth. As currently written, the patent statute does 
not explicitly address the prior art status of inventions and 
discoveries made in outer space and whether future extraterrestrial 
discoveries might invalidate existing patents. 
This article proceeds in the following Parts: Part I reviews 
the basics of patent law and patent theory in order to understand 
the problems that private entry into the field of space exploration 
and exploitation poses for the patent system. Part II identifies 
problems posed for traditional patent law by the possibility of 
extraterrestrial discoveries and summarizes those problems which 
Congress has addressed. Next, Part III identifies a category of 
issues—the status of extraterrestrial discoveries as prior art under 
patent law—that still requires attention, and presents two simple 
scenarios providing context for the policy considerations bearing on 
how patent law should treat extraterrestrial prior art. Part IV 
offers a precedential framework for addressing the problem. 
Finally, Part V suggests an approach to analyzing extraterrestrial 
prior art that, while contrary to a literal reading of current law, is 
consistent with the constitutional mandate to “promote progress”18 
through the patent laws and is supported by early precedent. 
I. A CRASH COURSE IN PATENT THEORY AND LAW 
Monopolies are generally considered undesirable.19 
According to economic theory, monopolies raise consumer prices 
 
is subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty and control of the State above which 
it lies. It extends from the surface of the earth to a height where the presence 
of air is so negligible as to provide less than Y per cent of aerodynamic lift, at 
a forward speed of B miles per hour.  
Haber, supra 14, at 24. 
 18 Article I Section 8 of the Constitution grants Congress the power “[t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors 
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 19 See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 319 (1980) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting); see also Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 7–10 (1966). 
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and stifle innovation.20 Yet, the Constitution provides authority to 
grant limited term exclusivity21 and, since the first Congress, 
patents (which are in effect government-sanctioned monopolies22) 
have been part of U.S. law.23 In the words of Thomas Jefferson, 
patents provide an incentive for “things which are worth to the 
public the embarrassment” of a monopoly.24 
Patents are thought to be “worth the embarrassment” of a 
monopoly because innovators often have the option of profiting from 
their innovations without providing the public benefit of disclosure.25 
Patents provide an incentive to disclose how to make and use 
inventions. In exchange for public disclosure (which destroys trade 
 
 20 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945) 
(“Many people believe that possession of unchallenged economic power deadens 
initiative, discourages thrift and depresses energy; that immunity from competition is a 
narcotic, and rivalry is a stimulant, to industrial progress; that the spur of constant 
stress is necessary to counteract an inevitable disposition to let well enough alone.”); see 
United States v. Corn Prods. Refining Co., 234 F. 964, 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1916) (recognizing 
monopoly “power to exclude others from entering [an] industry”). 
 21 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl 8. 
 22 The Supreme Court has observed that “a patent is not, accurately speaking, 
a monopoly . . . . The term monopoly connotes the giving of an exclusive privilege 
for . . . a thing which the public freely enjoyed prior to the grant . . . . An inventor 
deprives the public of nothing which it enjoyed before his discovery.” United States v. 
Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186 (1933). In the broader sense of the term, 
patents may be viewed as monopolies: they constrain others from competing with the 
owner of the patent within the scope of its claims. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012). 
 23 The tradition of U.S. patents reaches back to pre-Revolution England as well 
as to Colonial America. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 557 n.13 (1973); Pennock 
v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 17 (1829); Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress 
of Science and Useful Arts: The Background and Origin of the Intellectual Property Clause 
of the United States Constitution, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 12 (1994). South Carolina had a 
general patent statute. An Act for the Encouragement of Arts and Sciences, 1784 S.C. Pub. 
Laws 333-34. Ga. An Act for the Encouragement of Literature and Genius (1786) and N.H. 
Act for the Encouragement of Literature and Genius (1783) had intellectual property 
statutes broad enough to cover both copyrights and patents. Under the Articles of 
Confederation, the power to grant patents was not among the rights granted to the central 
government and was therefore reserved to the states. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. 
II; Max Stul Oppenheimer, Harmonization Through Condemnation: Is New London the 
Key to World Patent Harmony, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 445, 475 n.160 (2007) 
[hereinafter Oppenheinmer, Harmonization]. The power was granted to the national 
government under the Constitution through what has variously been called the Intellectual 
Property Clause, the Copyright Clause, and the Patent Clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 
8; Max Stul Oppenheimer, Defending Breakthrough Innovation: The History and Future of 
State Patent Law, 20 UCLA J. L. & TECH. 1, 3–7 (2016). 
 24 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813) https://
founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/03-06-02-0322 [https://perma.cc/XG3E-Z6BV]. 
 25 They can do so by relying on trade secret protection. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS 
ACT § 1(4) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985). The trade secret option has been made more 
attractive by the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, § 5(a) , 125 Stat. 
284, 297 (2011) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2012)) which made it a defense 
to patent infringement if the alleged infringer could show use of the patented invention—
even in secret—more than a year before the patent application was filed. Thus, the Act 
eliminated one disadvantage of maintaining an innovation as a trade secret: the risk 
that someone else might independently invent the same technology, patent it, and use 
the patent to prevent the innovator from using it. 
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secrecy),26 patents provide broader27—but limited-term28—
protection for inventions.29 This public disclosure is thought to be of 
greater benefit to society than trade secret use, because it allows 
others to learn from the invention and build on it.30 
While it is an article of constitutional faith31 that patents 
provide the public benefits of increased inventive activity and 
disclosure of inventions, there are those who have presented 
convincing arguments to the contrary. For example, in the 
eighteenth century, Thomas Jefferson observed that “generally 
speaking, other nations have thought that these monopolies 
produce more embarrassment than advantage to society, and it 
may be observed that the nations which refuse monopolies of 
invention, are as fruitful as England in new and useful devices.”32 
Two hundred years later, Josh Lerner produced the data to support 
Jefferson’s intuition. Examining 177 changes in patent policy from 
1852 to 1998 in sixty of the largest economies, he concluded that 
 
 26 One requirement for maintaining a trade secret is that the information not 
be publicly known. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (UNIF. LAW. COMM’N 1985). Patents 
are published, at the latest, when issued. 
 27 Trade secrets only grant the right to prevent “misappropriation,” which is 
defined as the “disclosure or use of a trade secret” acquired by “improper means.” Id. 
§ 1(2)(ii)(A). Thus, independent invention is a defense to trade secret infringement, and 
most states recognize reverse engineering of a publicly sold product as beyond the 
protection of trade secret law. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 
476 (1974). Patents grant the exclusive right to manufacture, use, sale or importation, 
even against reverse engineering and even against those who independently develop the 
same technology. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012). 
 28 Trade secrets last as long as the definitional requirements are met: 
reasonable steps to prevent disclosure and lack of public knowledge. See UNIF. TRADE 
SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (NAT’L CONF. COMM’RS 1985). Patents typically last for twenty years 
from the date an application is filed. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012). 
 29 A report on the effects of patents commissioned by the Federal Trade 
Commission succinctly summarized the pros and cons of the system: 
Awarding patent rights . . . is not costless. An innovator whose patent confers 
market power can raise prices or depress output (and . . . broad initial patent 
rights can sometimes interfere with follow-on innovation). These effects may 
be the price of progress, if the promise of a patent grant is necessary to elicit 
an invention, its disclosure, or investment in it. If invention, disclosure, or 
investment would have occurred even without the promise of a patent award, 
however, these costs hurt consumers unjustifiedly. 
FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION 
AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 1–2 (2003) (footnotes omitted). The report further noted 
“competition to win a patent right may drive a race to innovate. Indeed, firms competing 
to innovate may approach research problems differently, increasing the chances of 
successful innovation.” Id. at 2. 
 30 Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 511 
(1917) (“[T]he primary purpose of our patent laws is not the creation of private fortunes 
for the owners of patents, but is ‘to promote the progress of science and useful arts . . . .’” 
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8)); see also KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 427 
(2007); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1966). 
 31 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 32 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, supra note 24. 
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“[a]djusting for the change in overall patenting, the impact of 
patent protection-enhancing shifts on applications by residents 
was actually negative.”33 
Evidence to the contrary notwithstanding, Congress believes 
(as the Constitution commands) that “[i]f the United States is to 
maintain its competitive edge in the global economy, it needs a 
system that will support and reward all innovators with high quality 
patents.”34 Recognizing Jefferson’s concerns, the patent statute35 is 
at least designed to attempt to limit patent grants to inventions 
“worth the . . . embarrassment.”36 
Arguably the most important step in assuring that the public 
gets appropriate value for the patent monopoly is the requirement 
that an applicant prepare and file a written application, describing 
how to make and use the invention.37 This assures that the 
fundamental bargain—a limited term monopoly in exchange for 
disclosure—is met. Most applications are published approximately 
eighteen months after filing,38 and all patents are published.39 
The invention must fall within at least one of four statutory 
categories: (1) machine; (2) manufacture; (3) composition of matter; 
 
 33 Josh Lerner, Patent Protection and Innovation over 150 Years 12, 27 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 8977, 2002), https://www.nber.org/papers/
w8977.pdf [https://perma.cc/5DB7-HDB]. 
 34 H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, at 40 (2011). 
 35 The constitutional authority to provide limited-term incentives for 
innovation is exercised in Title 35 of the U. S. Code, regulations governing patents are 
contained in Title 37 of the Code of Federal Regulations, and specific internal rules 
governing the handling of patent applications are contained in the Manual of Patent 
Examining Procedure (MPEP). It should be noted that, while many of the rules for each 
are similar, there are actually three types of patents issued by the United States: utility 
patents, design patents, and plant patents. The type which most people mean when 
referring to a “patent” is the utility patent, and that is the meaning of the term “patent” 
as used in this article. 
 36 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, supra note 24. 
 37 35 U.S.C. § 111; 35 U.S.C. § 112 (a) (2012). The process of obtaining a patent, 
referred to as “patent prosecution,” is initiated by submitting the written application to the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). See Patent Prosecution Overview, JUSTIA, 
https://www.justia.com/intellectual-property/patents/patent-prosecution/ [https://perma.cc/
9BDF-HVEJ]. The operation of the USPTO is outlined in a comprehensive guidance document 
for patent examiners, known as the Manual of Patent Examining Procedures (MPEP). See 
generally MPEP (9th ed., Rev. 8, Jan. 2018). Trade secrets, on the other hand, require no filing. 
 38 35 U.S.C. § 122(b) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 1.211 (2018); MPEP § 1309 (9th ed. Rev. 8 
Jan. 2018). 
 39 35 U.S.C. §§ 111, 154. The requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112(a)—that “[t]he 
specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and 
process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable 
any person skilled in the art to which it pertains . . . to make and use the same”—assure 
that the public receives adequate disclosure in exchange for the patent monopoly. 
916 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84:3 
or (4) process.40 The invention must also be useful,41 meaning, 
under United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) 
guidelines, that the claimed invention has a “specific, substantial 
and credible” use.42 The threshold for utility is not high,43 but the 
invention must be able to work. At a minimum, it must not violate 
the known laws of physics.44 
The statute also requires that the invention be “novel.”45 If 
the public already has access46 to the invention, there is no need 
to grant a monopoly with a patent in order to get disclosure.47 
Thus, beginning with the first patent statute,48 patents have been 
available to novel inventions only, a requirement reflected in 
Sections 101 and 102 of the current statute.49 Since patents are 
 
 40 “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may 
obtain a patent . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012); see also Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 
416 U.S. 470, 483 (1974) (“[N]o patent is available for a discovery, however useful, novel, 
and nonobvious, unless it falls within one of the express categories of patentable subject 
matter of 35 U.S.C. § 101 . . . .”). Certain types of inventions that fall within the literal 
terms of the statute are not patentable because of judicially announced exceptions: 
“Phenomena of nature, though just discovered, mental processes, and abstract 
intellectual concepts are not patentable as they are the basic tools of scientific and 
technological work.” Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). “[P]henomena of 
nature. . . . are part of the storehouse of knowledge . . . . free to all men and reserved 
exclusively to none.” Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948). 
Whether a given claim covers statutory subject matter is a question of law and reviewed 
without deference. AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc’ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 
1999). Nevertheless, “[t]he boundary between patentable and unpatentable subject 
matter is not always a bright line.” In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1994) 
(Newman, P., concurring). The Supreme Court itself noted that the “line between a 
patentable ‘process’ and an unpatentable ‘principle’ is not always clear.” Parker v. Flook 
437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978). 
 41 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 42 U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF 
PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURES § 2107 (9th ed. 2015). 
 43 Fuller v. Berger, 120 F. 274, 275 (7th Cir. 1903) (An invention is useful 
unless “it is incapable of serving any beneficial end”). See generally Brenner v. Manson, 
383 U.S. 519, 532–36 (1966) (explaining the threshold for utility for patents). 
 44 Raytheon Co. v. Roper Corp., 724 F.2d 951, 956–57 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (A claim 
that requires “accomplishing an unattainable result” is invalid.). 
 45 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102 (2012). 
 46 In the patent context, “access” does not necessarily mean that the public realizes 
what it has access to, under a doctrine known as “inherency.” This poses a particularly 
difficult issue for the treatment of extraterrestrial prior art. See discussion infra Part III. 
 47 See Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 151 U.S. 186, 196–97 (1894) (if two identical 
inventions are claimed, it is proper to reject the second as not “novel”). 
 48 The Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109, 110. 
 49 35 U.S.C. § 101 provides: 
Inventions patentable—Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and 
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the 
conditions and requirements of this title. 
35 U.S.C. § 102 provides (with exceptions related to publications by, or derived from, the 
patent applicant): 
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intended to provide an incentive to add to the public domain, a 
patent cannot be granted for something that is already in the 
public domain.50 The definition of public domain has been 
modified from time to time, but fundamentally consists of 
information51 available to the public prior to the applicant’s date 
of invention52 and information available to the public more than a 
year prior to the applicant’s priority date. This information is 
collectively known as “prior art.”53 
The statute also prevents granting patent monopolies on 
trivial advances, i.e., those that would have been considered 
“obvious” by someone of ordinary skill in the field54 who, under 
the rules of the patent statute, is presumed to have complete 
 
 (a) NOVELTY; PRIOR ART.—A person shall be entitled to a patent 
unless— 
 (1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, 
or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective 
filing date of the claimed invention; or 
 (2) the claimed invention was described in a patent . . . . 
“Public use” has been defined as use by a person other than the inventor who is under 
no restriction by the inventor. There is an exception for experimental use of an invention 
by or under control of the inventor in order to perfect the invention. Elizabeth v. 
Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 128, 135 (1877) (“[S]uch use is not a public use . . . so long as the 
inventor is engaged, in good faith, in testing its operation.”); see also, e.g., Allied Colloids, 
Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 64 F.3d 1570, 1576–77 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (discussing the 
requirements of experimental use). 
 50 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146–50 (1989) 
(stating that Congress cannot remove information from the public domain because 
removal would thwart the constitutional mandate to promote the progress of science and 
the useful arts.) A claimed invention which is rejected for lack of novelty is referred to 
as “anticipated” by the reference which shows that it is not novel. “[A] prior patent or 
other publication to be an anticipation must bear within its four corners adequate 
directions for the practice of the [invention].” Dewey & Almy Chem. Co. v. Mimex Co., 
124 F.2d 986, 989 (2d Cir. 1942); see also Lincoln Stores, Inc. v. Nashua Mfg. Co., 157 
F.2d 154, 159–60 (1st Cir. 1946); Gordon Form Lathe Co. v. Walcott Mach. Co., 32 F.2d 
55, 58 (6th Cir. 1929). 
 51 Under prior law, there were two categories of information which formed the 
public domain. Printed publications and patents anywhere in the world qualified, but other 
acts qualified only if they occurred in the United States. 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) (2006). The 
distinction was eliminated under current law. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. 
No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, 285–86 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 102(d) (2012)). 
 52 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). Under the pre-AIA statute, inventive activity 
abroad could not be used to establish a date of invention unless the activity took place in 
a North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) or World Trade Organization (WTO) 
country. 35 U.S.C. § 104 (2006). Activities by individuals domiciled in the United States, 
a NAFTA country, or a WTO country but serving outside those countries on behalf of one 
of those countries could also qualify as covered inventive activity that could establish a 
date of invention. Id. § 104(2)(A)–(C). 
 53 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012). The applicant may be able to claim a priority date, 
which is usually the date of the first application filed by the applicant which describes 
the claimed invention, provided certain technical requirements are met. 
 54 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012). 
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knowledge of the prior art.55 While recognized by judicial 
interpretation more than a century ago,56 the concept of 
“obviousness” did not enter the patent statute until 1952.57 
Under the standard, things which would be obvious to others of 
ordinary skill in the relevant field are not patentable. As 
explained by the Supreme Court in Graham v. John Deere: 
Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be 
determined; differences between the prior art and the claims at issue 
are to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent 
art resolved. Against this background, the obviousness or 
nonobviousness of the subject matter is determined.58 
The Supreme Court expanded its explanation of the 
obviousness requirement in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, 
Inc.: “[g]ranting patent protection to advances that would occur in 
the ordinary course without real innovation retards progress and 
may, in the case of patents combining previously known elements, 
deprive prior inventions of their value or utility.”59 Finally, the 
application must contain claims that define the invention and are 
sufficiently specific to apprise the public of the scope of the 
claimed patent rights.60 
After the patent application is filed, the application is 
examined by a patent examiner, who determines which, if any, of 
the claims satisfy all of the statutory requirements for 
patentability. Those which do are allowed, and form part of the 
issued patent.61 Following the grant of a patent, the specification 
and drawings are published, thereby destroying any trade secrets 
which might have existed in the application.62 In return, the patent 
owner is granted the right to stop others from making, using, 
 
 55 See In re Winslow, 365 F.2d 1017, 1020 (C.C.P.A. 1966). 
 56 See Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248, 265–67 (1851). 
 57 Bryson Act, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792, 798 (1952) (codified as amended at 35 
U.S.C. § 103 (2012)). 
 58 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966). 
 59 KSR Int’l. Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419 (2007). 
 60 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012) (“The specification shall conclude with one or more claims 
particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant 
regards as his invention.”). 
 61 A patent application includes a description of the invention and how it 
relates to the state of the art, and a separate portion that defines what the applicant 
claims. MPEP § 608.01(c)-(d) (9th ed. Rev. 8, Jan. 2018). Both portions together are 
referred to as the patent “specification.” MPEP § 608.01(a). The only portion that may 
be infringed, however, is the claim section. See MPEP 2100-7 (“The claims define the 
property rights provided by a patent, and thus require careful scrutiny.”). 
 62 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(4). 
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importing, selling, or offering to sell63 products incorporating the 
claimed invention64 during the term of the patent.65 
In litigation, issued patents (and each of their claims) are 
presumed valid,66 but a litigant claiming that a patent is invalid 
can rebut the presumption by showing that any of the conditions 
of patentability described above were not met.67 An alleged 
infringer may also defend by showing that there is not actually 
infringement, by showing that the allegedly infringing activity is 
not covered by the patent, by showing that the alleged infringer 
is licensed to use the patented technology, or by showing that the 
patent is unenforceable.68 
Two additional points deserve mention: territoriality and 
exclusivity. Traditional patent law is, unsurprisingly, territorial in 
that it only governs activities within the United States.69 As 
extraterrestrial activities became more common, the United States 
and several other countries reached treaty agreements governing 
the application of domestic patent law to activities in space.70 
Additionally, with regard to exclusivity, patents are, as provided by 
the Constitution, “exclusive” rights.71 The term does not mean that 
the patent owner is the exclusive person with the affirmative right 
to practice the patented invention;72 it means that the patent owner 
may “exclude” others from practicing the patented invention. 
Issues concerning in which territory activity must take place to 
 
 63 Id. § 271. There are also specific provisions regulating some of the more 
obvious ways of avoiding a technical reading of the scope of patent protection: inducing 
infringement by knowingly supplying a material component especially adapted for use 
in infringing, id. § 271(c), or by supplying substantial portions of a patented invention so 
as to induce the combination into the patented invention, id. § 271(f), or carrying out a 
patented process outside the United States, then importing the product into the United 
States, id. § 271(g). There are also special provisions, not here relevant, relating to 
certain biological inventions and applications relating to FDA approval. Id. § 271(e). 
 64 The patent statute defines “claimed invention” as “the subject matter defined 
by a claim in a patent or an application for a patent,” Id. § 100(j), and “invention” as 
“invention or discovery.” Id. § 100(a). It also defines “process” to include “a new use of a 
known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material.” Id. § 100(b). 
 65 The term of a patent is ordinarily the period “beginning on the date on which 
the patent issues and ending 20 years from the date on which the application was first 
filed in the United States.” Id. § 154(a)(2). 
 66 Id. § 282(a). 
 67 Id. § 282(b)(2)–(3). 
 68 Id. § 282(b)(1). 
 69 See id. § 271. 
 70 See infra Part II. 
 71 “Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added). 
 72 A moment’s thought will illustrate why this is so. Suppose that one 
individual invents and patents the wheel, and a second individual invents and patents 
an automobile that includes four wheels. If the second individual could, by virtue of the 
automobile patent, make and sell automobiles with four wheels without permission from 
the owner of the wheel patent, the patent on the wheel would be meaningless. 
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constitute “practicing” (and whether that includes outer space) 
have largely been addressed, and are discussed in Part II. That 
leaves, however, issues concerning what constitutes an “invention” 
(and whether to consider activities in outer space in resolving 
them)—these are addressed in Part III. 
II. SOLVED PROBLEMS IN EXTRATERRESTRIAL LAW 
General legal implications of space flight and 
extraterrestrial exploration and exploitation have been well-
studied and the “big” questions of sovereignty and jurisdiction have 
been addressed.73 In addition, several patent issues have been 
identified and resolved, either by domestic statute or by treaty74: 
(1) which nation’s patent law applies to activities in space; (2) 
which activities in space qualify as “domestic” for purposes of 
priority; and (3) what qualifies as infringing activity. 
In 1990, Congress provided by statute that, in general, 
inventions made, used, or sold in outer space on a spacecraft 
under the jurisdiction of the United States are treated as if within 
the United States,75 and are also treated as if within the United 
States if covered by international agreement.76 In effect, the 
statute equates space objects under U.S. jurisdiction with other 
territories and possessions under the jurisdiction of the United 
States. While broad for the time, this statute still leaves 
 
 73 The Russian launch of Sputnik in 1957 triggered a spate of articles 
considering questions of ownership and sovereignty in outer space. See, e.g., John C. 
Cooper, The Russian Satellite—Legal and Political Problems, 24 J. AIR L. & COMM. 379, 
379–83 (1957); D. Broward Craig, National Sovereignty at High Altitudes, 24 J. AIR L. & 
COMM. 384, 384–90 (1957); Eugène Pépin, Legal Problems Created by the Sputnik, 4 
MCGILL L. J. 66, 67–69 (1957). Most of these questions were subsequently resolved, at 
least by countries having the capability of space travel, by treaty. 
 74 See infra notes 75–80. There is one major space treaty that the United States has 
not acceded to: The Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies, Dec. 5, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, 22 (1979) [hereinafter Moon Treaty]. Article 11 
of that agreement states that “[t]he moon and its natural resources are the common heritage of 
mankind,” therefore “[t]he moon is not subject to national appropriation by any claim of 
sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means” and “[n]either the surface 
nor the subsurface of the moon, . . . or natural resources in place, shall become property of any 
State, international intergovernmental or non-governmental organization, national 
organization or non-governmental entity or of any natural person.” Id. at 25 (emphasis added); 
see also Status of Treaties ch. XXIV Outer Space, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION (Apr. 4, 
2019), https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXIV-
2&chapter=24&clang=_en [https://perma.cc/FW5F-LJUQ]. 
 75 Act of Nov. 15, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-580, 104 Stat. 2864, 2863 (codified as 
amended at 35 U.S.C. § 105 (2012)) (“Any invention made, used, or sold in outer space 
on a space object or component thereof under the jurisdiction or control of the United 
States shall be considered to be made, used or sold within the United States . . . .”). 
 76 Id. (“Any invention made, used, or sold in outer space on a space object or 
component thereof that is carried on the registry of a foreign state . . . shall be considered 
to be made, used or sold within the United States . . . if specifically, so agreed in an 
international agreement between the United States and the state of registry.”). 
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unresolved the status of extraterrestrial inventions (and prior art) 
in general—only spacecraft under U.S. jurisdiction are covered. 
Additionally, in 1994, the United States acceded to the 
1994 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights, which provides that “patents shall be available 
and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the 
place of invention.”77 Then, in 1998, the United States acceded to 
the 1998 Agreement Concerning Cooperation on the 
International Space Station, which provides that “each Partner 
shall retain jurisdiction and control over the elements it 
registers . . . and over personnel in or on the Space Station who 
are its nationals” and recognizes the jurisdiction of the partner’s 
courts and application of national laws regarding criminal 
matters, civil liability, and protection of intellectual property 
rights.78 Finally, in 2011, the America Invents Act79 eliminated 
nationality requirements for non-published prior art. In doing 
so, it may have raised more questions than it answered 
regarding extraterrestrial aspects of U.S. patent law.80 
Thus, a framework for dealing with intellectual property in 
space has been established, at least as far as questions of 
jurisdiction and the scope of enforcement of domestic patent rights. 
Questions remain, however, and the most significant of them 
relate, not to enforcement of existing rights, but rather to 
acquisition of new rights. 
III. UNSOLVED PROBLEMS: TWO PARADIGMATIC POLICY 
PROBLEMS 
One aspect of patent law that has remained unexplored 
is the impact of extraterrestrial occurrences81 on patentability of 
earth-borne inventions. The impact might be felt in one of two 
ways, both resulting from the patent law requirement that, to be 
patentable, an invention must be new82 and non-obvious.83  
 77 TRIPS: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
art. 27, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
 78 Agreement Concerning Cooperation on the Civil International Space 
Station, arts. 5, 16, 21–22, Jan. 29, 1998, T.I.A.S No. 12,927. 
 79 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) 
(codified as amended at various sections of 35 U.S.C. (2012)) [hereinafter “AIA”]. 
 80 See infra Part III. 
 81 Occurrences, such as publications, public use, and public dissemination of 
knowledge which may be used to evaluate the novelty of a claimed invention are referred 
to as “prior art.” As discussed in Section IV.A.1 infra, there are certain categories of prior 
art which were not available to the public prior to the invention of, or application for a 
patent on, the claimed invention. This has consequences, discussed in Parts IV and V, infra. 
 82 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–102 (2012). 
 83 Id. § 103. 
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In one scenario, a terrestrial inventor might make an 
invention, never before seen on Earth, that is subsequently 
discovered on another planet. Conventional patent law denies 
patents to anything “naturally” occurring or previously known 
by others. Should the terrestrial inventor be denied a patent? On 
the one hand, the subsequent discovery takes nothing away from 
the effort, ingenuity, and benefits to progress afforded by the 
earth-borne invention. On the other hand, the invention is not 
technically new—it already existed. 
In a second scenario, a terrestrial inventor might make an 
invention, never before seen on Earth, but previously invented and 
known by an alien civilization and (accepting the possibility of 
future alien contact) subsequently introduced to Earth by that 
alien civilization. On the one hand, the subsequent introduction 
takes nothing away from the effort, ingenuity, and benefits to 
progress afforded by the earth-borne invention. On the other hand, 
the terrestrial inventor is not technically the “first inventor” under 
the America Invents Act (AIA).84 
A simple example will illustrate the policy problem that 
space exploration and exploitation poses for patent law. Assume 
that there is a compound that does not exist naturally on Earth, 
but does exist naturally somewhere in the universe.85 Then 
imagine that a U.S. inventor, after years of research and millions 
of dollars in cost, develops this same compound on Earth, 
unaware that it already exists in space. The compound is useful 
and non-obvious, and the inventor obtains a U.S. patent. This 
patent gives the inventor the right to stop others from making, 
using, or selling the compound in the United States and to stop 
others from importing the compound into the United States. 
Subsequently, a space exploration company (after years of 
research and millions of dollars in cost) discovers the same 
 
 84 See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, sec. 3, 125 Stat. 
285–93 (2011). For a discussion of the concepts and implications of “inventorship” under 
“first inventor” and “first filer” systems, see Oppenheimer, Harmonization, supra note 
23, at 448–54 (2007). 
 85 This is a reasonable assumption given the vastly different natural conditions 
in space, for example near-vacuum and near absolute zero temperatures in space, 
thermonuclear temperatures on stars and almost infinite gravity in black holes. If, 
however, the assumption is incorrect, then the problem disappears and the solution is 
simple: if there is no prior art in space, then the current statute’s “worldwide” coverage 
is in effect “universal” coverage and no changes are required. See MIRIA M. FINCKENOR 
& KIM K. DE GROH, NAT’L AUERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN., A RESEARCHER’S GUIDE TO: 
INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION: SPACE ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS 10–16 (2015), 
https://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/files/NP-2015-03-015-JSC_Space_Environment-
ISS-Mini-Book-2015-508.pdf [https://perma.cc/VK93-2Y56]; Space Environments and 
Effects Program, NASA https://see.msfc.nasa.gov [https://perma.cc/QRP8-QYBB]. 
2019] IS THE SKY THE LIMIT? 923 
compound on an asteroid and begins mining it.86 So far, there is 
no problem under patent law. The inventor can prevent others 
from making the compound in the United States, but the 
exploration company is not making the compound (and certainly 
not in the United States). The inventor can stop others from using 
the compound, but only in the United States. The inventor can 
stop others from selling the compound in the United States—but 
so far, no sale has yet taken place (and certainly not in the U.S.). 
The inventor can stop others from importing the compound into 
the United States, but so far, the compound is still on the asteroid. 
A conflict will arise, though, if the exploration company 
tries to import the compound into the United States since 
importation is one of the exclusive rights of the patent owner.87 
How, then, should ownership of the invention be determined? The 
options are to: (1) award ownership to the terrestrial inventor, who 
has provided the valuable technology to the public before it was 
discovered elsewhere; (2) award ownership to the extraterrestrial 
discoverer as an incentive to make the huge expenditures and take 
the huge risks involved in space exploration; or (3) award it to 
neither and have the result dictated by the literal language of the 
current statute and judicial interpretation. 
A second set of issues arises by virtue of improved remote 
sensing technology.88 It is now possible to detect and, to some 
extent, characterize objects at distances so great that current 
technology holds no prospect of actually reaching those objects.89 
For example, spectral analysis of the light from distant stars can 
 
 86 Although extremely scarce and parceled out for research by the microgram, 
samples have already been brought back by space missions—samples which may carry 
material that, while naturally occurring in space, only exists on Earth if artificially created. 
Meteorites pose the same issues but are random visitors and are therefore unlikely to present 
the type of economic incentive that would bring these issues to the fore. See Rob Davies, 
Asteroid Mining Could Be Space’s New Frontier: The Problem Is Doing It Legally, GUARDIAN 
(Feb. 6, 2016 11:00 AM EST), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/feb/06/asteroid-
mining-space-minerals-legal-issues [https://perma.cc/D7NK-3AQH]. See generally Why 
Asteroids, PLANETARY RESOURCES, https://www.planetaryresources.com/why-asteroids/ 
[https://perma.cc/RJJ9-557P] (discussing a private company’s focus on developing deep space 
exploration capabilities by mining water from asteroids); DEEP SPACE INDUSTRIES, http://deep
spaceindustries.com [https://perma.cc/99CF-E6WW] (discussing a private company’s 
“ambitious venture to mine the resources of asteroids”). 
 87 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012). It would also be an infringement of the inventor’s patent 
to sell the compound in the U.S., but that would require prior importation from the asteroid. 
 88 See John F. Mustard & Jessica M. Sunshine, Spectral Analysis for Earth 
Science: Investigations Using Remote Sensing Data, in REMOTE SENSING FOR THE EARTH 
SCIENCES: MANUAL OF REMOTE SENSING 251, 251 (Andrew N. Rencz ed., 6th ed., 
1999), http://www.geo.brown.edu/research/Milliken/GEOL1710_files/Mustard_Manual
OfRemoteSensing_Ch5.pdf [https://perma.cc/4M8L-AEBP]; Remote Sensors, NASA: 
EARTHDATA (Apr. 16, 2018, 8:34AM EDT) https://earthdata.nasa.gov/user-
resources/remote-sensors [https://perma.cc/7PRL-KX6V]. 
 89 See Remote Sensors, supra note 88. 
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identify elements which are present on those stars.90 If the 
spectral analysis of a star reveals that there are spectral lines 
not previously observed (and therefore indicating the presence 
of a previously unknown element), should this constitute prior 
art which would deny a patent to an earthbound inventor who 
subsequently synthesizes that element on Earth? 
Once again, one option is to award a patent to the 
terrestrial inventor, who has provided the public with actual access 
to an element which, while theoretically identified in outer space, 
was in no way accessible to the public prior to the terrestrial 
inventor’s efforts. The other option is to hold the newly identified 
element unpatentable91—the result dictated by the literal language 
of the current statute and judicial interpretation. 
Ordinarily, analysis of a development not anticipated by the 
Founders would begin with the language of the Constitution as 
adopted, any prior versions of the language, and the insight that 
contemporary discussion might offer. In the case of patent rights, the 
analysis is brief: “No delegate to the Constitutional Convention has 
left any record concerning the interpretation or meaning placed on 
the intellectual property clause by the delegates themselves.”92 
A. Issues Under 35 U.S.C. § 101: Is Nature Universal? 
If an earthbound inventor creates something that does not 
exist naturally on Earth, it is potentially patentable.93 If it does 
exist naturally on Earth but that fact is unknown when the 
USPTO reviews the patent application, a patent will be granted. 
But if it is subsequently discovered in nature, the hypothetical 
patent will be held invalid.94 Should the same result apply if the 
 
 90 See id. 
 91 The person who deduced the existence of the element by observing the 
spectral lines would not be able to get a patent because the observation and deduction 
do not teach how to make and use the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012); see also infra 
Section II.D. The person who synthesized the element on earth would not be able to get 
a patent because the element was already known under a literal reading of 35 U.S.C. 
§ 102 (2012). See discussion supra notes 45–53 and accompanying text. 
 92 Edward C. Walterscheid, Inherent or Created Rights: Early Views on the 
Intellectual Property Clause, 19 HAMLINE L. REV. 81, 92 (1995). For a summary of 
available research and thinking on the genesis of the IP clause, see Max Stul 
Oppenheimer, The Time and Place for “Technology-Shifting” Rights, 14 MARQ. INTELL. 
PROP. L. REV. 269, 273–81 (2010). 
 93 Invention itself, of course, is not enough for patentability: the other 
requirements, discussed in Part I, supra, must be met. 
 94 Patents are presumed valid. 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012). That presumption may, 
however, be overcome by showing that the decision to issue the patent was flawed, for 
example, because there was prior art that the USPTO had not considered before issuing the 
patent. Canron, Inc. v. Plasser Am. Corp., 609 F.2d 1075, 1075 (4th Cir. 1979) (per curiam). 
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invention does not, in fact, exist naturally on Earth but does exist 
elsewhere in the universe? 
The answer turns on interpretation of Section 101. That 
section of the patent statute has been described as a gatekeeper,95 
defining the only categories of invention which are eligible for 
patent consideration: “new and useful process[es], machine[s], 
manufacture[s], or compositions of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement thereof.”96 The Supreme Court, however, has 
engrafted three exceptions to the categories enumerated as 
patentable: “laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract 
ideas.”97 The Court further explained that “[t]he concepts covered 
by these exceptions are ‘part of the storehouse of knowledge of all 
men . . . free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.’”98 
A literal reading of Supreme Court precedent might lead to 
the conclusion that the hypothetical patent should be invalidated. 
The cases place no geographic limits on the location in which the 
laws of nature apply, or the physical phenomena exist. To date, 
however, the Court has only had to deal with earthly inventions, 
laws of nature, and physical phenomena. Should the Court’s 
language extend to either: (1) inventions made in space; (2) laws of 
nature which do not apply on Earth but do apply in space;99 or (3) 
 
 95 See In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007); State St. Bank & 
Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., 149 F.3d 1368, 1372 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (noting that 
§ 101 is a threshold issue that must be addressed before other questions of patentability); 
In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 960 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (“The first door which must be opened on 
the difficult path to patentability is § 101.”). This view, however, finds no support in the 
patent statute and is contrary to the stated practice of the USPTO. Patent examiners 
are instructed that their review of a patent application is to be “complete as to all 
matters.” 37 C.F.R. § 1.104(b) (2018); see also MPEP § 707.07(g) (9th ed. Rev. 8, Jan. 
2018) (“[p]iecemeal examination should be avoided as much as possible.”). 
 96 35 U. S. C. § 101 (2012). 
 97 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 601 (2010) (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 
447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980)). 
 98 Id. at 602 (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo lnoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 
130 (1948)). 
 99 It was once an article of scientific faith that the universe is governed by a 
single set of laws of physics which apply everywhere. See, e.g., Neil deGrasse Tyson, On 
Earth as in the Heavens, NAT. HIST. MAG., Nov. 2000, at 90–92 (“The universality of 
physical laws drives scientific discovery like nothing else.”); Neil de Grasse Tyson, 
Telling the Story, NAT. HIST. MAG., Feb. 2000, at 48 (“All parts of the known universe 
reflect the same basic laws of nature we observe and test here on Earth.”). Some now 
question that assumption. See Swinburne Univ. of Tech., Laws of Physics Vary 
Throughout the Universe, New Study Suggests, SCIENCE DAILY (Sept. 9, 2010) 
https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2010/09/100909004112.htm [https://perma.cc/SF
42-LFTP] (According to Dr. Michael Murphy from Swinburne University, “It’s one of the 
biggest questions of modern science—are the laws of physics the same everywhere in the 
universe and throughout its entire history?” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Dr. 
Murphy is one of the authors of a 2011 article which reported detecting minute variations 
in what were thought to be cosmological constants, raising the possibility that the laws 
of physics are not constant throughout the universe. J. K. Webb et al., Indications of a 
Spatial Variation of the Fine Structure Constant, 107 PHYS. REV. LETT. 191101 (2011). If 
that is the case, then extraterrestrial discoveries would not necessarily constitute prior 
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physical phenomena (including “natural” compounds) which are 
natural in space, but not on Earth? Would the rationale that these 
are “part of the storehouse of knowledge of all men” apply even 
though very few have access to them?100 Any of these issues would 
be questions of first impression. 
There is, however, a clue in the issuance of U.S. Patent 
3,161,462.101 That patent, which claimed a new transuranium 
compound, “Element 96 and compositions thereof,” was issued 
to Glen T. Seaborg, assignor to the U.S. Atomic Energy 
Commission in 1964.102 While Dr. Seaborg was the first person 
to isolate Element 96 (curium) on Earth, the element clearly 
exists in other parts of the universe103 (and, in fact, exists on 
Earth in minute quantities).104 The fact that the patent office 
issued the patent suggests that isolation of a natural element, 
although technically a physical phenomenon (and therefore 
unpatentable under the literal reading of the Supreme Court’s 
language), might still be patentable if the newly isolated 
element were not otherwise obtainable on Earth.105 The Seaborg 
patent was never challenged in court, so there is no definitive 
judicial guidance on the issue. In the absence of judicial 
guidance, the views (and actions in determining to issue the 
patent) of the USPTO would be illuminating. It is possible that 
the USPTO raised objections to the application since the 
application was pending before the USPTO for fifteen years.106 It 
 
art, as they would exist under different conditions than those on Earth. However, even 
assuming that physical laws are, in fact, universal, there are still certainly 
manifestations of those laws which do not exist on Earth but do exist in space. An 
example would be a black hole. 
 100 Of course, if space travel becomes commonplace, the analysis would need to change. 
 101 U.S. Patent No. 3,161,462 (filed Feb. 7, 1949) (issued Dec. 15, 1964). 
 102 Id. 
 103 It was speculated that curium was produced in stars, and its natural existence 
in other parts of the universe was confirmed when it was detected in a meteorite. Francois 
L.H. Tissot, Nicholas Dauphas, & Lawrence Grossman, Origin of Uranium Isotope 
Variations in Early Solar Nebula Condensates, 2 SCI. ADVANCES *1, *2 (2016). 
 104 It is thought that “[m]inute amounts [of curium] may exist in natural 
deposits of uranium.” Periodic Table: Curium, ROYAL SOC’Y OF CHEMISTRY, 
http://www.rsc.org/periodic-table/element/96/curium [https://perma.cc/USX8-JJD4]. 
 105 The process of isolating curium for the first time on Earth was 
extraordinary. It began by placing 100 mg. of plutonium, itself extraordinarily hard to 
come by at the time, in a cyclotron (a rare scientific tool at the time) and bombarding it 
with helium ions, dissolving it in sulfuric acid, evaporating the sulfuric acid solution, 
then dissolving what remained in dilute nitric acid. What had not dissolved in the dilute 
nitric acid was then dissolved by heating with a nitric acid/hydrofluoric acid mixture and 
oxidized. Finally, lanthanum fluoride was precipitated from the solution carrying with 
it insoluble curium trifluoride, from which curium was isolated. See ‘462 Patent. 
 106 Currently, the average time to disposition—the time from filing a patent 
application until it is either issued or abandoned—is roughly two years. See U.S. PATENT 
& TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 2 (2018). 
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was filed February 7, 1949 and issued December 15, 1964.107 
Such USPTO objections would be reflected in the application file, 
which is a public document,108 yet the file for this application is 
“missing.”109 Therefore, all that can be said for certain is that the 
courts have not addressed the issue and, if the USPTO had 
concerns about patentability under such circumstances, those 
concerns were overcome and the patent was issued.110 
B. Issues Under 35 U.S.C. § 102: Is Novelty Restricted to 
Earth? 
There has been an evolution in the view of what constitutes 
prior art, beginning with what might be termed “insular prior art” 
(limited to materials that are actually available to the public within 
the jurisdiction),111 evolving to what might be termed “feasibly 
available prior art” (consisting of materials that are actually 
available to the public within the jurisdiction plus materials that 
have a high probability of becoming available to that public),112 and 
 
 107 ‘462 Patent. 
 108 37 C.F.R. § 1.11 (2018); see also MPEP § 103 (9th ed. Rev. 7., Jan. 2018). 
 109 Correspondence on file with the author. 
 110 In a similar case, dealing with claims to the invention of Element 95 
(Americium), the USPTO had rejected claims to the element, because in its view the 
same element would have been produced—although not recognized—by earlier 
experiments using a Fermi reactor. In re Seaborg, 328 F.2d 996, 999 (C.C.P.A. 1964). In 
that case, the court reversed the rejection, concluding that there was “no positive 
evidence that americium was produced . . . by the operation of the [Fermi] reactor” in 
light of an affidavit that concluded that the earlier production of Americium by a Fermi 
reactor was purely theoretical, and that the theoretical calculations showed that 
the maximum amount of americium-241 that could have been produced in the 
reactor . . . can be calculated to be 6.15 × 10-9 gram. Thus, the reactor could 
have produced no more than one billionth of a gram of americium-241, and this 
one billionth of a gram would have been distributed throughout forty tons of 
intensely radioactive uranium reactor fuel. This amount of an unknown, 
unconcentrated isotope, if present, would have been undetectable. 
Id. at 997. Because the decision rested on a failure of proof, it did not resolve the issue 
of patentability of a newly isolated element. It is possible, though, that this case, decided 
in March of 1964, may have persuaded the USPTO to abandon any challenge to the 
claims to Element 96 and issue the patent—after fifteen years of review—in December 
1964. See ‘462 Patent. While the file itself is missing, the typical time taken to complete 
the mechanical step of issuing the patent once the decision has been made that the 
invention is patentable and the applicant has paid the issue fee is about two months, 
which suggests that the USPTO’s decision that the invention was patentable must have 
occurred very shortly after the decision in In re Seaborg. 
 111 The Venetian and early British systems of patents of importation are 
examples. See infra Section IV.A.4. 
 112 The U.S. system from 1836 to 2012 is an example. During that period, prior 
art consisted of things known or used in the U.S. plus printed publications anywhere. 
See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006) (pre-AIA). An explanation of this distinction is provided in 
In re Tenney: A printed publication is more likely to become available to the public than 
is personal knowledge held abroad. Printing implies a number of copies, and books travel 
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culminating in what might be termed “unrestricted prior art” 
(consisting of materials known or used anywhere).113 
When Congress overhauled the patent statute in 1952, the 
committee reports from both chambers stated that patentable 
subject matter was intended to “include anything under the sun 
that is made by man.”114 The related questions of whether prior 
art as well encompassed everything under the sun and whether 
“under the sun” meant “on Earth” were not considered by the pre-
space age Congress. Therefore, the novelty requirement, set out 
in Section 102, was written in terms of activities in this country, 
and activities in this or a foreign country, without mention of 
activities beyond Earth. 
The 1952 version of Section 102 set out the requirement 
(which remained in force until the America Invents Act115 was 
enacted in 2011) that, to be patentable, an invention must be novel116 
Thus, under the 1952 patent statute, a patent application 
would be rejected as anticipated if the claimed invention had been 
disclosed in a prior publication anywhere, but in order to reject it 
based on unpublished knowledge, use or offer for sale, such activity 
would have had to have taken place within the United States. 
1. Impact of AIA amendments 
The post-space age amendments to the patent statute 
enacted in the America Invents Act eliminated these geographic 
distinctions.117 The language chosen, however, was not written 
with the possibility of extraterritorial prior art in mind, and 
therefore raise (probably inadvertently) the first novelty issue 
posed by extraterrestrial activity. 
As amended by the AIA, Section 102 now provides (with 
exceptions related to publications by, or derived from, the 
patent applicant): 
 
across national boundaries more easily than people do. See In re Tenney, 254 F.2d 619, 
625–26 (C.C.P.A. 1958). 
 113 The current, post-AIA U. S. system is an example. Prior art consists of things 
published, known or used or “otherwise available to the public”, without reference to 
geography. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012 & Supp. V 2018)). 
 114 S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952). The 
language from the committee reports was quoted as support for the holding in Diamond 
v. Chakrabarty that genetically engineered organisms were, although alive, patentable. 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980). 
 115 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). 
 116 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006 & Supp. V 2012)) (pre-AIA). If a prior art reference 
discloses what is claimed in a patent claim, the reference makes the claim unpatentable 
because the claim does not cover a novel invention and is said to “anticipate” the claim. 
See supra note 49–53 and accompanying text. 
 117 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284, 285 (2011). 
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(a) NOVELTY; PRIOR ART.—A person shall be entitled to a patent 
unless— 
(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed 
publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the 
public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.118 
Eliminating the “in this country” language from the statute has 
the consequence of broadening the scope of prior art considered 
in evaluating the novelty, and therefore patentability, of a 
claimed invention. The question that remains is whether the 
language change was intended to remove all spatial limitations 
on the location of prior art (and therefore include 
extraterrestrial prior art) or simply to remove the distinction 
between domestic and foreign (earthly) prior art.119 It is certainly 
possible that, by removing not only the language “in this 
country” but also the language “in this or a foreign country” the 
intent was to remove location as a factor in enumerating prior 
art—i.e., anything in the universe could qualify. If this was the 
intent, the new language introduces a new ambiguity: the 
meaning of “public.” It is hard to support the argument that the 
twelve people who have walked on the moon120 constitute “the 
public.”121 Thus, if a lunar astronaut had observed something on 
the moon and had written a publication describing it or filed a 
patent application based on it, it would clearly constitute prior 
art under Section 102(a);122 the observation itself would not 
(unless “public” is read to cover such a small and constrained 
group) constitute prior art.123 
 
 118 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (2012). The statute also permits certain patent 
applications to be considered prior art that can invalidate claims even though the 
applications were not available to the public at the time the claims were filed. 35 U.S.C. 
§ 102(a)(2) (2012). This provision was not changed by the AIA amendments. 
 119 The question is not addressed in the legislative history. 
 120 For a list of people who have walked on the moon, see Atkinson, supra note 5. 
 121 Some support for the proposition might be found in the treatment of 
classified information as prior art. While it is not considered a publication until it is 
declassified, once declassified it may be used as evidence of prior knowledge as of the 
date of its (classified) dissemination. MPEP 707.05(f) (8th ed. Rev. 9., Aug. 2012). There 
is still an issue whether the classified dissemination was sufficiently broad to constitute 
“public” knowledge, but the fact that it was not available to the “general public” does not 
disqualify it. Of course, it cannot be prior art at all until it is declassified, because until 
then neither the USPTO nor a potential infringement defendant would have access to it. 
 122 Information which is disseminated to a small group under an obligation of 
confidentiality is not prior art. MPEP 2128.01(III). However, published information is 
clearly covered by Section 102(a). 
 123 This interpretation would also help explain the decision to issue the Seaborg 
patent: even accepting that curium existed naturally in “minute quantities” or was 
unintentionally created in earlier nuclear experiments, the number of people who would 
have had access to it was small and selected (and under obligations of confidentiality). 
See In re Seaborg, 328 F.2d 996, 999 (C.C.P.A. 1964). 
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2. Application of the “Inherency” Doctrine 
A second novelty-related problem implicates the doctrine 
of “inherency.” The inherency doctrine is described by the 
USPTO as follows: 
The express, implicit, and inherent disclosures of a prior art reference 
may be relied upon in the rejection of claims . . . . The discovery of a 
previously unappreciated property of a prior art composition, or of a 
scientific explanation for the prior art’s functioning, does not render 
the old composition patentably new to the discoverer . . . . [and] just 
as the discovery of properties of a known material does not make it 
novel, the identification and characterization of a prior art material 
also does not make it novel.124 
The policy behind the inherency doctrine is that, if the public 
already has access to the technology, there is no need to 
purchase it with a patent monopoly—even if the public does not 
know that it has access to the technology. The policy is 
constitutionally required: Congress cannot remove information 
from the public domain because removal would thwart the 
constitutional mandate to promote the progress of science and 
the useful arts.125 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
in EMI v. Cypress Semiconductor offers this illustration of the policy: 
A hypothetical example clarifies this principle. Humans lit fires for 
thousands of years before realizing that oxygen is necessary to create 
and maintain a flame. The first person to discover the necessity of 
oxygen certainly could not have obtained a valid patent claim for “a 
method of making a fire by lighting a flame in the presence of oxygen.” 
Even if prior art on lighting fires did not disclose the importance of 
oxygen and one of ordinary skill in the art did not know about the 
importance of oxygen, understanding this law of nature would not give 
the discoverer a right to exclude others from practicing the prior art 
of making fires.126 
Thus, a prior art reference may anticipate a claim even if it does 
not explicitly disclose every feature of the claimed invention if each 
“missing [feature] is necessarily present, or inherent, in the single 
anticipating reference.”127 In that case, the public had access to the 
 
 124 MPEP § 2112 (9th ed. Rev. 7, Jan. 2018) (internal citations and quotation 
marks omitted). A single prior art reference that discloses, either expressly or inherently, 
each limitation of a claim invalidates that claim by anticipation. Minn. Mining & Mfg. 
Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc., 976 F.2d 1559, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 125 See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141, 146, 150 (1989). 
 126 See EMI Grp. N. Am., Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 268 F.3d 1342, 
1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 127 See Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 
2003); see also Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Inherency, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 371, 
379 (2005) (Where courts “actually find inherent anticipation . . . . the determining factor 
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inherent feature—even if the public was not specifically aware that 
the feature was present. Similarly, “[n]ewly discovered results of 
known processes” are “not patentable”—those results are inherent 
in the known processes.128 
In other words, contrary to the intuitive meaning of 
“prior” art, there are certain “later” activities that are still 
considered “prior” art.129 An example is presented in the Myriad 
case.130 In that case, the patent applicant had discovered a gene 
sequence that had significant therapeutic value. Prior to the 
discovery by the applicant (and recognition of the significance of 
the gene sequence), no human knew of its existence or function. 
Prior to the discovery by the applicant, however, the gene 
sequence (obviously) existed. The Court held the discovery 
unpatentable as a mere discovery of a natural substance.131 
Thus, it was the applicant’s own discovery that defeated the 
patent—but for that discovery, no one would have known that 
the gene sequence existed (and therefore constituted prior art, 
which denied the applicant’s right to the patent). 
In another example, In re Cruciferous Sprout Litigation, 
researchers at Johns Hopkins had determined that, at an early 
stage of development, broccoli sprouts were high in a compound 
that had cancer-fighting properties, and claimed “a method of 
preparing food products rich in glucosinolates . . . [by] harvesting 
sprouts prior to the 2-leaf stage, to form a food product comprising 
 
appears to be that the public has already benefitted from the presence of the claimed 
invention in the prior art, even though it may not have been aware of the invention itself.”). 
 128 See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Ben Venue Labs., Inc., 246 F.3d 1368, 1376 
(Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 129 Patents are presumed valid. 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012). That presumption 
may, however, be overcome by showing that the patent should not have been issued, for 
example because there was prior art that the USPTO had not considered during the 
prosecution of the patent, i.e., later discovered prior art. 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(2) (2012). It 
is also possible for information that was unknown to the public at the time of the 
invention may still constitute “prior” art. For example, classified material is considered 
published when declassified, but may be considered “known” at an earlier date. See supra 
note 121. Thus, there might be information to which the general public gained access 
only after the invention was made (or after a patent application is filed), but which might 
be treated as prior art because of developments subsequent to the invention (and possibly 
even subsequent to the filing of the patent application). Interestingly, this logic is not 
applied to the seemingly similar situation of magazine articles. As to those, the USPTO 
takes the position that the effective date of a magazine is the date it reaches an 
addressee, not the date it is mailed. MPEP § 2128.08 (9th ed., Rev. 8, Jan. 2018). This 
position is supported by caselaw. See Canron, Inc. v. Plasser Am. Corp., 609 F.2d 1075, 
1075 (4th Cir. 1979) (per curiam); Bergstrom v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 599 F.2d 62, 64–
65 (8th Cir. 1979) (per curiam). Neither the USPTO nor the cases have taken the second 
step of acknowledging that by the time a magazine is placed in the mail, its contents 
must be “known by others” (the authors, editors, production staff, etc.). 
 130 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (2013). 
 131 Id. at 591, 596. 
932 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84:3 
a plurality of sprouts.”132 No one else had recognized the high 
concentrations of glucosinolates in sprouts at this early stage, but 
the court held the claims invalid because the inventors merely 
discovered an inherent, although previously unappreciated, 
property of the sprouts.133 
In the USPTO’s view, “[t]here is no requirement that a 
person of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized the 
inherent disclosure at the time of invention, but only that the 
subject matter is in fact inherent in the prior art reference.”134 
C. Issues Under 35 U.S.C. § 103: What Is the Person of 
Ordinary Skill Presumed to Know? 
In addition to requiring novelty, the patent statute requires 
that, in order to be patentable, the claimed invention must not be 
obvious to people of ordinary skill in the relevant art.135 
The underlying reason for denying patents based on 
obviousness is to limit the grant of patent monopolies to 
situations in which the public receives in exchange technology 
which it would not otherwise receive,136 and inventions which are 
 
 132 See In re Cruciferous Sprout Litig., 301 F.3d 1343, 1345, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 133 Id. at 1350–52. 
 134 MPEP § 2112 (9th ed., Rev. 8, Jan. 2018) (citing Schering Corp. v. Geneva 
Pharm. Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see also Schering Corp. v. Geneva 
Pharm. Inc., 339 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Schering Corp. owned a patent (4,282,233) 
covering loratadine, the active component of Claritin, a blockbuster antihistamine 
marketed by Schering, and a method of using the compound to treat allergies. Id. at 
1374–75. When the patent was about to expire, Schering applied for a patent covering 
descarboethoxyloratadine (DCL), the compound created in a user’s body when loratadine 
is metabolized. Id. at 1375. The court held that, although DCL was unknown until 
disclosed in the new patent, the method of treatment disclosed in the original patent 
necessarily produced DCL when a patient took Claritin and therefore the 4,282,233 
patents anticipated the later application. Id. at 1380–81. The court rejected the 
contention that inherent anticipation requires that a person of ordinary skill in the art 
would have recognized the existence of the inherent property. Id. at 1377. There is at 
least one case holding, to the contrary, that not only must the missing element be 
inherently present, but in addition it must have been recognizable by a person of 
ordinary skill. See Continental Can Co. USA v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1268 (Fed. 
Cir. 1991). These positions seem inconsistent. The Federal Circuit has stated, however, 
“[o]ur cases have consistently held that a reference may anticipate even when the 
relevant properties of the thing disclosed were not appreciated at the time.” Abbott Labs. 
v. Baxter Pharm. Prods. Inc., 471 F.3d 1363, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2006). For detailed analysis 
and attempts to rationalize the positions, see Janice M. Mueller & Donald S. Chisum, 
Enabling Patent Law’s Inherent Anticipation Doctrine, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1101, 1102–03, 
1106–07, 1116–17, 1150 (2008). See generally Cynthia Chen, Note, Schering Corp. v. 
Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: Clarification of the Inherent Anticipation Doctrine and Its 
Implications, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 95 (2005). 
 135 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012). 
 136 The obviousness standard was codified as 35 U.S.C. § 103 in 1952, but the 
principle that inventions which were technically new, but encompassed only minor 
variations on known technology was recognized judicially as an extension of the 
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obvious variations of what already is available would, in the 
ordinary course, become available as well. This goal justifies the 
judicially created fiction that the hypothetical person of ordinary 
skill knows everything that is available to the public. In In re 
Winslow, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (predecessor 
of the Federal Circuit) held that the obviousness of a claimed 
invention was to be determined with reference to a hypothetical 
person of ordinary skill in the field who was presumed to have 
complete knowledge of all relevant prior art.137 
The goal of denying patents for ideas that would likely 
become available to the public without intervening invention 
justifies the fiction that the hypothetical person of ordinary skill 
knows everything that is available to the public. The question 
remains: how far should the fiction extend? The notion of 
ignoring the cost of assembling the knowledge appears implicit 
in the Winslow rationale, so that the knowledge available to the 
hypothetical person of ordinary skill should include knowledge 
brought back to Earth from space, even at great cost. 
The harder question is whether the fiction should extend to 
every natural phenomenon, whether previously observed or not, and 
whether existing on Earth or not, or should it only apply to natural 
phenomena that had been reported back to the hypothetical 
earthbound person of ordinary skill? This question implicates the 
inherency doctrine discussed above,138 but with a complication. The 
application of the doctrine of inherency in a determination of 
obviousness is more complicated than in a determination of novelty 
because “[t]hat which may be inherent is not necessarily known and 
that which is unknown cannot be obvious.”139 Inherency can defeat 
novelty because what is claimed is not really new—it was just not 
recognized. Obviousness, however, requires a determination that 
someone of ordinary skill would likely have been able to achieve the 
claimed invention knowing all that was known. If an inherent 
property was not previously known, it would not have been available 
to the hypothetical person of ordinary skill to use in achieving the 
claimed invention. 
An even harder extension of the Winslow fiction to justify 
would be knowledge of as-yet unappreciated properties of things 
that exist in the universe but not as yet on Earth. Such an 
extension would appear to require that the hypothetical person of 
 
statutory novelty standard in 1850 in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood. Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 
52 U.S. (11 How.) 248, 265–67 (1850). 
 137 In re Winslow, 365 F.2d 1017, 1020 (C.C.P.A. 1965). 
 138 See supra Section III.B.2. 
 139 See Honeywell Int’l Inc. v. Mexichem Amanco Holding S.A. DE C.V., 865 F.3d 
1348, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting In re Rijckaert, 9 F.3d 1531, 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
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ordinary skill, in addition to having complete knowledge of 
everything known about the field, including as-yet unappreciated 
properties of known materials, can also predict the future and 
foresee information that exists in the universe but has not yet 
been introduced to the earthbound “public.” 
D. Issues Under 35 U.S.C. § 112: Enablement and Claiming 
Section 112 of the patent statute requires that an 
applicant for a patent describe how to make and use the claimed 
invention140 (the “enablement” requirement) and provide claims 
which define the invention141 (the “claiming” requirement).142 Both 
requirements are typically met with earthbound applications in 
mind.143 The two requirements are related. The degree of 
enablement required (and the scope of available prior art) is 
defined by the scope of the claims. The applicant need only enable 
what is claimed, and only material which is relevant to the claims 
is relevant prior art.144 If the claims are not fully supported by the 
enabling description, they are referred to as overbroad and will 
not be allowed145; on the other hand, an applicant wants to claim 
as much as possible and does not want the claims to fail to include 
everything that has been enabled and is not precluded by prior 
art. Therefore, both requirements will require reevaluation as 
extraterrestrial activity becomes more common. 
It would be unusual for a patent application to recite that 
the invention is to be made or used “under standard conditions 
on earth” in order to make the invention operative,146 because 
most inventions are intended to be made and used on Earth147 
and therefore those conditions are implicit. Conditions would not 
normally be recited unless non-standard conditions were 
required to describe how the invention would be made or used. 
In addition, it would be unusual to need to recite “standard” 
conditions in order to distinguish the claimed invention from 
 
 140 35 U.S.C. § 112(a). 
 141 Id. § 112(b). 
 142 Id. § 112(a)–(b) (2012). 
 143 There are exceptions, typically patents directed to inventions intended to be 
used in space. See, e.g., U. S. Patent No. 4,815,279 (filed Apr. 13, 1987) (issued Mar. 28, 
1989) (issued to Franklin R. Chang for “Hybrid plume plasma rocket”). Claim 1 is 
illustrative: “A space vehicle having a selectable vehicle velocity and a selectively 
adjustable thrust . . . .” Id. col. 6. 
 144 See supra Section III.B.2. 
 145 MPEP § 706.03(c) (9th ed., Rev. 8 Jan. 2018). 
 146 35 U.S.C. § 112. 
 147 In addition, if the invention happened to work in some extraterrestrial 
environments, it would inherently satisfy the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012). 
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prior art: most prior art is earthbound and therefore also 
operates under “standard” conditions.148 
As extraterrestrial activity increases, however, the 
conditions under which an invention is intended to operate will 
become relevant. If an invention requires oxygen to operate, 
enablement for earthbound operations would not require explicitly 
stating so, while enablement for operation in space would require 
an explanation of how the required oxygen will be supplied. 
Related to the question of whether it is necessary to be 
explicit regarding conditions which are implicit on Earth is the 
question of whether it is necessary to be explicit in defining the 
scope of the invention. As discussed above, claims in a patent 
application are rejected under Section 102 if they have already 
been disclosed in the prior art or under Section 103 if they have not 
been disclosed in the prior art, but would have been obvious given 
what is in the prior art.149 If a claim is specifically limited to 
particular conditions, then it cannot be rejected unless the prior art 
discloses, or renders obvious, those conditions. Careful applicants 
may therefore begin drafting claims to inventions which are 
intended to operate on Earth to include explicit terms that limit 
the operation and definition of the invention to earthly conditions. 
In addition to satisfying enablement requirements, this will also 
have the effect of reducing the scope of extraterrestrial prior art 
that might otherwise be used to reject claims. 
IV. DESIGNING A SOLUTION 
A comprehensive approach to the application of patent 
law to extraterrestrial activity is currently missing two 
elements. It should include rules governing the protection of 
extraterrestrial innovation: and should address the questions of 
whether new compounds discovered in space and new 
technologies invented in space should be protectable under U.S. 
patent law and, if so whether they should be protectable even if 
they represent “principles of nature” in the location where 
discovered or invented, but not on Earth. It should also include 
rules governing the use of extraterrestrial discoveries to deny 
patents for innovations made on Earth: if an invention is made 
on Earth (meaning that human intervention was required in 
order to make it possible) but the same “invention” occurs 
 
 148 If there were extraterrestrial prior art that needed to be distinguished, the 
applicant would have the option of limiting the claims either spatially (to Earth) or of 
specifying conditions that exist on Earth but not at the location where the 
extraterrestrial prior art was found. 
 149 See supra Section III.B–C. 
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naturally in some extraterrestrial environment, should that 
deny the earthbound inventor of a patent? If so, should it matter 
whether the extraterrestrial phenomenon was unknown at the 
time the earthbound inventions was made? 
Any solution must either be consistent with the Constitution 
and treaties, or must be sufficiently compelling to justify changing 
them. The solution must, of course, also be consistent with federal 
law, but presumably the selected solution will either be lawful or 
sufficiently compelling to persuade Congress to adopt the necessary 
legislation, and “the powers of Congress to legislate upon the subject 
of patents is plenary by the terms of the Constitution, and as there 
are no restraints on its exercise, there can be no limitation of their 
right to modify them at their pleasure.”150 
There is, surprisingly, a question as to whether the 
Constitution is the supreme law of the land, or whether treaties 
are co-equal with the Constitution. The Constitution grants the 
president the power “by and with the Advice and Consent of the 
Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators 
present concur”151 and also provides that “[t]his Constitution, 
and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in 
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the 
supreme Law of the Land.”152 
As Professor Tribe notes, a treaty “may effectively repeal 
preceding congressional legislation and preempt conflicting state 
law,”153 but this leaves open the question whether a treaty can 
override the Constitution. In 1870, the Supreme Court held that 
“a treaty cannot change the Constitution or be held valid if it be 
in violation of that instrument.”154 In 1957, the Court held an 
executive agreement, which gave U.S. military courts exclusive 
jurisdiction over U.S. servicemen and their families stationed in 
Great Britain, unconstitutional.155 
The uncertainty regarding the hierarchy of treaties and 
the Constitution arise because, as Nowak and Rotunda observe: 
“Justice Holmes suggested once . . . that treaties were equal to 
the Constitution, even if they were not made in pursuance of it. 
As a consequence, the theory developed that treaties were not 
 
 150 See McClurg v. Kingsland, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 202, 206 (1843). 
 151 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 152 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 153 LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 645 (3d ed. 2000). 
 154 The Cherokee Tobacco Case, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616, 620–21 (1870). 
 155 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5, 15–19, 40–41 (1957) (holding that the executive 
agreement violated the Fifth and Sixth Amendments). 
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subject to any constitutional limitations.”156 Nowak and Rotunda 
go on, however, to conclude “[t]his view is incorrect. As Justice 
Field stated, in often quoted dictum in De Geofroy v. Riggs, the 
treaty power, like all other powers that the Constitution grants, 
is subject to constitutional limitations.”157 
The hierarchy of the Constitution, statutes, and treaties 
continues to provide fuel for debate,158 and three commentators 
have analyzed the possibility of using the Treaty Power to 
overcome perceived constitutional problems in the specific context 
of intellectual property rights.159 Since there appear to be no 
conflicts between the Constitution and current treaties, however, 
the analysis will proceed on the assumption that any solution 
should be consistent with those treaties.160 
The United States is a signatory to three major treaties 
which could constrain extraterrestrial patent principles.161 The 
first, the 1994 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement),162 is not by its 
terms directed to activities in space. It does not appear that the 
negotiators were focused on questions of extraterrestrial activity, 
but rather were attempting to harmonize patent laws among 
nations. The treaty does, however, contain language which 
appears broad enough to cover activities in space: “patents shall 
be available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination 
 
 156 JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 242 (6th ed. 
2000) (footnote omitted) (citing Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920). 
 157 Id. (citing De Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 266–67 (1890). 
 158 See, e.g., Audrey I. Benison, International Criminal Tribunals: Is There a 
Substantive Limitation on the Treaty Power?, 37 STAN. J. INT’L L. 75, 75 (2001); David 
M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the Nationalist 
Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075, 1077–79 (2000); Timothy R. 
Holbrook, The Treaty Power and the Patent Clause: Are There Limits on the United 
States’ Ability to Harmonize?, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 2–4 (2004). 
 159 See Holbrook, supra note 158, at 4; Caroline T. Nguyen, Note, Expansive 
Copyright Protection for All Time? Avoiding Article I Horizontal Limitations Through the 
Treaty Power, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1079, 1079–84 (2005); Oppenheimer, Harmonization, 
supra note 23, at 483–87. 
 160 Of course, if a desired solution conflicted with a treaty, there would be the option 
to withdraw from the treaty. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing from 
International Custom, 120 YALE L.J. 202, 204 (2010). But see Lea Brilmayer & Isaias 
Yemane Tesfalidet, Treaty Denunciation and “Withdrawal” from Customary International 




 161 See Agreement Concerning Cooperation on the Civil International Space 
Station, supra note 78; TRIPS Agreement, supra note 77; Treaty on Principles Governing 
the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon 
and Other Celestial Bodies, opened for signature Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 
U.N.T.S. 205 (entered into force Oct. 10, 1967) [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty]. 
 162 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 77, 1869 U.N.T.S. at 299. 
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as to the place of invention. . . . .”163 Arguably, by using the phrase 
“place of invention” rather than, for example, “country of 
invention,” the treaty applies to extraterrestrial activity.164 
Assuming that the treaty does apply to extraterrestrial activity, 
it would require granting patents on inventions without 
discrimination simply because they were “invented” in space, but 
would place no other constraints on the proposed solutions.165 
The second major treaty that the United States is a 
signatory to is the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of 
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the 
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, which prohibited colonization of 
the moon and other celestial bodies “by claim of sovereignty, by 
means of use or occupation, or by any other means.”166 Article VI 
requires signatories to assure that activities by their nationals, 
whether by governmental agencies or by non-governmental 
entities are carried out in conformity with the treaty.167 Article VIII 
provides that signatories retain jurisdiction over objects launched 
into space including objects constructed on a celestial body.168 
Article VII makes each signatory “internationally liable for damage 
to another State Party to the Treaty or to its natural or juridical 
persons.”169 Although there are no cases on patent infringement 
under this treaty,170 these provisions read together appear to 
authorize actions for infringement of patents in space on the same 
basis as if the infringing activity had occurred within the 
signatory’s territory on Earth. 
The third major treaty signed by the United States is the 
1998 Agreement Concerning Cooperation on the International 
Space Station, which provides that “each Partner shall retain 
jurisdiction and control over the elements it registers . . . and 
over personnel in or on the Space Station who are its nationals” 
and recognizes the jurisdiction of the partner’s courts and 
 
 163 Id. at 311. 
 164 Id. 
 165 If the TRIPS treaty is determined not to apply to space, then it imposes no 
constraints whatsoever on the solutions. 
 166 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 161, 18 U.S.T. 2413, 610 U.N.T.S. 208. 
 167 Id. at 18 U.S.T. 2415, 610 U.N.T.S. 209. 
 168 Id. at 18 U.S.T. 2416, 610 U.N.T.S. 209. 
 169 Id. at 18 U.S.T. 2415, 610 U.N.T.S. 209. 
 170 One case asserting private property rights to an extraterrestrial object was 
dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. Nemitz v. United States, No. CV-
N030599-HDM (RAM), 2004 WL 3167042, at *1–2 (D. Nev. Apr. 26, 2004) (alleging 
trespass against the National Aeronautics and Space Administration for landing on an 
asteroid claimed by the plaintiff). 
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application of national laws regarding criminal matters, civil 
liability, and protection of intellectual property rights.171 
One additional treaty should be mentioned, although the 
United States has not acceded to it. The Agreement Governing 
the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies 
states that “[t]he moon is not subject to national appropriation by 
any claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any 
other means” and “natural resources in place, shall [not] become 
property of any State . . . non-governmental organization, . . . or 
of any natural person.”172 The specific language (“natural 
resources in place”) would not appear to implicate patent rights. 
The more general language (appropriation . . . by any other 
means), however, is arguably broad enough to cover patent rights 
if a patent claim covered activity on the moon. As the United 
States is not currently a signatory, this treaty is not considered 
further in the analysis that follows. 
Andrew Brehm analyzes the application of current 
treaties to property rights in space and concludes that such 
rights are not available to private parties.173 If that were 
generally true, it would severely constrain the development of 
intellectual property rights in space or arising from activities in 
space. His analysis focuses, however, on tangible property, and 
there are distinctions between tangible and intangible property 
which might allow a contrary conclusion with respect to 
intangible property rights, such as patents. Tangible property is 
exclusive in the sense that possession by one individual 
precludes simultaneous possession by anyone else; intangible 
property is non-exclusive—more than one person can hold the 
same trade secret, for example. As Thomas Jefferson observed, 
the “peculiar character [of an idea] . . . is that no one possesses 
the less, because every other possesses the whole of it. He who 
receives an idea from me, receives instructions himself without 
lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine receives light 
without darkening me.”174 In addition, tangible property is, by 
 
 171 Agreement Concerning Cooperation on the Civil International Space 
Station, supra note 78, at 5. 
 172 Moon Treaty, supra note 74, 1363 U.N.T.S. at 25 (emphasis added). 
 173 Andrew R. Brehm, Note, Private Property in Outer Space: Establishing a 
Foundation for Future Exploration, 33 WIS. INT’L L.J. 353, 359–62 (2015). Leslie Tennen 
likewise argues that national recognition of private property rights in space “would 
constitute a de facto exclusion of other states and their nationals, and thereby constitute 
a form of national appropriation” in violation of treaties, for example Article II of the 
Outer Space Treaty. Leslie I. Tennen, Towards a New Regime for Exploitation of Outer 
Space Mineral Resources, 88 NEB. L. REV. 794, 805 (2010). 
 174 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, supra note 24. As I have 
previously argued, “this observation was clearly a lapse of economic judgment for the 
sake of rhetoric. The basis of trade secret law is that there is economic value in keeping 
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definition, local—it exists at one particular place and, under 
traditional rules, is subject to the jurisdiction of that place—
while intangible property has no physical location and therefore 
may be subject to multiple, remote, jurisdictions.175 
Moreover, unlike tangible property claims in outer space, 
intangible property rights embodied in intellectual property could 
have effect only within terrestrial territories (at least until a court 
system is established in outer space). Claims would only be binding 
on individuals subject to the jurisdiction of the nation which 
granted those rights. This sort of jurisdiction is classically within 
the power of nations176 and not inconsistent with treaty obligations 
not to “claim” space.177 Therefore, if the treaty concerns relate to 
the threat of occupation of space and national control of space,178 
those concerns do not apply to intangible property and thus would 
not be pose the types of legal concerns identified by Brehm. 
In addition to satisfying any constraints imposed by treaty 
obligations, any solution must, of course, also be consistent with 
the Constitution. The principal constitutional constraint on patent 
laws in general is found in Article I of the Constitution. Any patent 
enactment must “promote the progress of [s]cience and useful 
[a]rts.”179 To date, no provision of the current patent statute has 
been found unconstitutional,180 so the extension of existing 
provisions to space should pose no special constitutional issues. 
 
competitors in the dark.” Max Stul Oppenheimer, In Vento Scribere: The Intersection of 
Cyberspace and Patent Law, 51 FLA. L. REV. 229, 236 n.20 (1999). The point regarding 
the non-exclusivity of intangible property is, however, valid. 
 175 See, for example, 35 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2012), which extends U.S. patent rights 
to cover manufacture, use or sale “in outer space on a space object or component thereof 
under the jurisdiction or control of the United States.” 
 176 In a sense, this is comparable to the patents of importation discussed infra Section 
IV.A.4. Both can be viewed as rewarding the importation of technology from abroad by imposing 
restrictions on the importing country’s citizens within the importing country’s borders. 
 177 See, e.g., Nemitz v. United States No. CV–N030599–HDM (RAM), 2004 WL 
3167042, at *1–2 (D. Nev. Apr. 26, 2004), (in which the plaintiff had claimed an asteroid 
on which a U. S. spacecraft had landed. The U.S. federal district court held that there 
was no cognizable cause of action against the United States—and, of course, there was 
no court on the asteroid in which the claim could be brought). 
 178 These do appear to be the principal concerns. For example, the Outer Space 
Treaty states “Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies is not subject to 
national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any 
other means.” Outer Space Treaty, supra note 161, 18 U.S.T. at 2413, 610 U.N.T.S. at 208. 
 179 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, see also KSR Int’l. Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 
398, 427 (2007). 
 180 The most recent provision of the patent statute to survive constitutional 
challenge is the process known as “inter partes review” (introduced in the AIA) whereby 
any member of the public may challenge an issued patent in an administrative 
proceeding within the USPTO. See 35 U.S.C. § 311 (2012); Oil States Energy Servs., LLC 
v. Greene’s Energy Grp., 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1371, 1379 (2018). In addition, many 
commentators questioned whether changing the “first inventor” provisions of the patent 
statute to “first to file” provisions is constitutional. See, e.g., Michael A. Glenn & Peter 
J. Nagle, Article I and the First Inventor to File: Patent Reform or Doublespeak?, 50 
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One existing constitutional constraint with potential 
application to options for dealing with extraterrestrial patent 
rights is the principle that only one patent may be issued for any 
invention.181 If two applicants claimed the same invention under 
the pre-AIA statute, ownership was resolved through an 
interference proceeding.182 Under the AIA, the interference 
proceeding was considered unnecessary and was replaced by a 
derivation proceeding to determine if the first applicant had 
obtained knowledge of the invention from the “true” inventor.183 
This “one invention/one patent” principle precludes solutions 
which allow two inventors. 
A. Available Models 
It is tempting to conclude that the impact of 
extraterrestrial activity on patent law is sui generis and that no 
precedent exists, leaving to Congress, writing on a blank slate, 
the task of figuring out which rules should apply. Surprisingly, 
however, these issues are not new. They were faced four hundred 
years ago and, in the interim, patent theory has developed 
different solutions to the tension between the desire to provide 
an incentive to innovate and the desire to limit monopolization 
of innovation. It turns out that, in addition to solutions that 
approach this as a wholly new problem, there have been earlier 
situations when new “worlds” opened up and they provide 
models that could be useful for determining the impact of the 
opening of this most recent “new world” on patent law. 
 
IDEA: INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 441, 457–61 (2010); Holdbrook, supra note 158, at 6; Brad 
Pedersen & Vadim Braginsky, The Rush to a First-to-File Patent System in the United 
States: Is a Globally Standardized Patent Reward System Really Beneficial to Patent 
Quality and Administrative Efficiency?, 7 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 757, 762–63 (2006); 
Karen E. Simon, Comment, The Patent Reform Act’s Proposed First-to-File Standard: 
Needed Reform or Constitutional Blunder?, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 129, 
139–43 (2006). So far, no judicial challenge to the AIA’s change to a first-to-file patent 
system has reached the appellate court level. 
 181 See Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 151 U.S. 186, 198 (1894). 
 182 35 U.S.C. § 135(a) (2006 & Supp. V 2012)) (pre-AIA statute). Under the 
interference system, in the rare case when two applicants claimed the same invention 
and had the identical filing date and the identical date of invention, the internal USPTO 
appeals board held that neither was entitled to the patent. Lassman v. Brossi, Gerecke, 
& Kyburz, 159 U.S.P.Q. 182, 1967 WL 7458, at *1–3 (B.P.A.I. 1967). 
 183 See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 289 
(2011) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 135 (2012 & Supp. V 2018))). The revisions 
were designed to ensure that the first person to file a patent application is actually an 
inventor. S. REP. No. 111-18, at 6 (2009). 
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1. Status Quo 
One possibility, of course, is to do nothing and await 
developments. Even given the pace of private activity directed to 
space exploration and exploitation, there is probably time to 
think and debate, or to simply wait until there is an undesirable 
result under current law and then attempt to fix it.184 This 
approach has the advantage of deferring action until there is 
more information about what problems might need to be 
addressed. One thing that is predictable about innovation, 
though, is that its timing is not predictable. Doing nothing until 
a specific problem arises has its own risks. 
By definition, maintaining the status quo maintains the 
problems identified in Section III.A.: uncertainty regarding the 
application of the Supreme Court’s doctrine of exclusion of 
natural phenomena from the definition of statutory subject 
matter under Section 101 (itself subject to considerable 
uncertainty) to extraterrestrial phenomena.185 
Likewise, by definition, maintaining the status quo also 
maintains the problems regarding the definition of prior art 
under Section 102, identified in Section III.B., (i.e., whether 
technology only observed by a few in space should preclude 
patentability of technology developed on Earth, and whether 
properties that are only inherent in space should preclude 
patentability of technology developed on Earth that uses such 
properties). Literal application of the inherency doctrine would 
limit the impact of extraterrestrial inherent prior art on 
earthbound inventions. The doctrine requires that for a prior art 
reference to anticipate a claim when a feature is not explicitly 
disclosed, the missing feature must be “necessarily present, or 
inherent, in the single anticipating reference.”186 Thus, if the 
missing feature only occurs in space, it is not “necessarily present” 
and should not anticipate a claim under the doctrine of inherency. 
Likewise, by definition, maintaining the status quo 
maintains the problems regarding the application of the 
obviousness standard under Section 103, identified in Section 
III.C, supra. In addition to the problems of geographic scope and 
inherency, the question of whether to assume that an earthbound  
 184 This approach may assume that there is more time before solutions are 
needed than is actually the case. See supra notes 7–12. 
 185 See generally Max Stul Oppenheimer, Patents 101: Patentable Subject 
Matter and Separation of Powers, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1, 44–47 (2012) 
[hereinafter Oppenheimer, Patents 101]. 
 186 Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
(citing Continental Can Co. v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 1991); see 
Burk & Lemley, supra note 127, at 379. 
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person of ordinary skill has complete knowledge of information 
only available in space. At some point, space travel and 
communication may become so common as to make this a 
reasonable assumption, but at the moment (and for the foreseeable 
future) the assumption stretches legal fiction to an extreme that is 
difficult to justify. Winslow adopted the legal fiction that the person 
determining obviousness knew all that people in the field could 
know about the subject; it did not require that person to know 
things that were generally unknown or unavailable.187 
2. Everyone Wins?: Why Granting Patents to Both 
Inventors Is Against Current Precedent 
Rather than choose between an earthbound inventor and 
an extraterrestrial inventor, a tempting solution is to award 
patents to both. While intuitively “fair,” awarding the patent to 
both would be contrary to current law188 and long-established 
precedent.189 The statute could be amended to eliminate the 
novelty impediment posed by Sections 101 and 102. However, 
the precedent set by Miller v. Eagle190 and the constitutional 
requirement that patents promote progress would certainly 
raise issues regarding the grant of more than one patent on the 
same innovation. In addition, there would be difficult 
administrative issues to solve: for example, each patentee would 
have the power to grant licenses, making it difficult to exercise 
the market control which is the hallmark of patent rights. 
While the specific problem that Section 101 poses 
regarding novelty can be addressed by amending the statute, 
this solution does not address the issue of patentable subject 
matter under Section 101, which implicates not only the statute, 
but the exceptions announced by the Supreme Court as a matter 
of constitutional command.191 
This solution would, however, eliminate the problems 
relating to Section 102 (and therefore, because the obviousness 
analysis under Section 103 is limited to materials available 
under Section 102) those relating to Section 103 as well. 
 
 187 In re Winslow, 365 F.2d 1017, 1020 (C.C.P.A. 1965). 
 188 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–102 (requiring that the invention be “new.”). 
 189 See Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 151 U.S. 186, 198 (1894). 
 190 Id. 
 191 See discussion supra Section III.A. 
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3. Universal Overhaul 
An ambitious approach would be the creation of an 
“extraterrestrial patent,” issued by an international organization, 
and governing manufacture, use, or sale in, and importation into, 
space.192 Putting aside the difficulty of negotiating such a treaty, 
it would have the advantages of eliminating potentially 
overlapping extraterrestrial jurisdictions with potentially 
inconsistent rules, and of providing a central repository of prior 
art so as to reduce the risk of inconsistent grants of patents. 
It would, however, have the potential to impact 
constitutional rights of nationals when in space, a step that 
would be difficult to distinguish from the attempt to restrict 
Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights of U. S. military families 
living abroad found unconstitutional in Reid v. Covert.193 In 
addition, setting up a regime that provided different rights for 
earthbound and extraterrestrial innovations would be 
challenging under the TRIPS treaty, which requires that patent 
rights not vary based on location.194 Finally, this approach would 
pose administrative issues similar to those presented by the 
“everyone wins” approach. 
While the specific problem that Section 101 poses 
regarding novelty could be addressed by a treaty and conforming 
amendments to the statute, the issue of patentable subject 
matter under Section 101 poses constitutional issues.195 The 
Supreme Court’s patentable subject matter jurisprudence is 
based on the principles that “[p]henomena of nature . . . are not 
patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and 
technological work”196 and “[l]aws of nature [are] free to all men 
and reserved exclusively to none” because they are “part of the 
storehouse of knowledge of all.”197 While, in the view of some, 
 
 192 One model that might be considered is the creation of a European Patent 
Office (created by the Convention on the Grant of European Patents), that conducts 
centralized review of patent applications and allows patents that may be enforced in all 
of its member countries. See generally EPO—Home, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE (Apr. 4, 
2019), https://www.epo.org/index.html [http://perma.cc/2YXU-FSB6], and for a list of 
member countries, see Member States of the European Patent Organisation, European 
Patent Office (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.epo.org/about-us/foundation/member-
states.html [https://perma.cc/T3DH-46BM]. 
 193 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5, 15–19, 40–41 (1957) (holding an executive 
agreement giving military courts exclusive jurisdiction over servicemen and their 
families stationed abroad a violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments). 
 194 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 77, 1869 U.N.T.S. at 311. The TRIPS 
Agreement could, of course, be amended to accommodate special rules for 
extraterrestrial innovation and enforcement of patent rights. 
 195 See discussion supra Section III.A. 
 196 See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). 
 197 See Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948). 
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Congress stretched the Constitution in adopting the first-to-file 
patent system under the AIA,198 the constitutional stretch 
required to permit patenting technology which is innovative on 
Earth but natural in space would require distinguishing (or 
limiting the broad language of) Supreme Court precedent. 
Furthermore, a carefully drafted treaty and statutory 
changes to implement the treaty provisions could resolve the 
novelty issues under Section 102 (and therefore, because the 
obviousness analysis under Section 103 is limited to materials 
available under Section 102) those relating to Section 103 as well. 
Care would need to be taken, however, to avoid adopting provisions 
that would result in withdrawing anything from the public domain. 
4. Forward to the Past 
The United States, from its inception, only granted 
patents to the “first inventor.”199 The first patent statute, enacted 
in 1790, provided for a petition for patent by “any person or 
persons . . . setting forth, that he, she, or they, hath or have 
invented or discovered any useful art, manufacture, engine, 
machine, or device, or any improvement therein not before 
known or used.”200 The second patent statute, enacted in 1793, 
provided for patents to be issued on petition by  
any person . . . being a citizen . . . of the United States, . . . . [who has] 
invented any new and useful art, machine, manufacture or 
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement of any art, 
machine, manufacture or composition of matter, not known or used 
before the application.201  
 
 198 See supra Section IV.A.2. 
 199 It is arguable that the U. S. abandoned the “first inventor” principle in 
adopting the America Invents Act. See, e.g., Oppenheimer, Harmonization, supra note 
23, at 449–55. Even under the AIA, however, patents are only granted to “an” inventor 
and a showing that someone else invented the technology first will defeat an application. 
See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284, 289 (2011) 
(codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 135 (2012 & Supp. V 2018)). The U.S. has never 
recognized “patents of importation.” As early as 1804, courts considered and rejected the 
notion. See Reutgen v. Kanowrs, 20 F. Cas. 555, 556 (C.C.D. Pa. 1804) (No. 11,710) 
(charging a jury that “if the invention was brought over [from Europe], that is, if it 
appears that the plaintiff was not the original inventor, in reference to other parts of the 
world as well as America, he is not entitled to a patent.”). Justice Story also rejected 
patents of importation in several cases. See Reed v. Cutter, 20 F. Cas. 435, 437–38 
(C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 11,645); Bedford v. Hunt, 3 F. Cas. 37, 37–38 (C.C.D. Mass. 
1817) (No. 1,217); Woodcock v. Parker, 30 F. Cas. 491, 492 (C.C.D. Mass 1813) (No. 
17,971) (“[A] subsequent inventor cannot, by obtaining a patent therefor, oust the first 
inventor of his right . . . . notwithstanding he may have been a subsequent inventor, 
without any knowledge of the prior existence of the machine . . . .”). 
 200 Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109–10. An earlier version of the statute 
would have authorized patents of importation. See infra notes 218–220. 
 201 Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318, 318–19. 
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Subsequent amendments to the patent statute retained 
the invention requirement.202 That is not, however, the only basis 
on which patentability might be determined. Putting aside the 
practice of granting royal monopolies to reward friends of (or 
contributors to) the monarch,203 there was a long history of 
granting patents not only to independent inventors but also to 
individuals who observed the technology abroad (and therefore 
were not independent inventors) but were the first to introduce 
it to the jurisdiction—“patents of importation.”204 The U.S. 
patent system was, in fact, the outlier when adopted. While 
several early U.S. cases rejected patents of importation,205 most 
European systems of the day allowed for a broader conception of 
invention than embraced by the first U. S. patent statute. For 
sound policy reasons, discussed below, they included within 
their systems grants for introduction of new technologies from 
abroad as well as for independent invention.206 
While there are earlier records of incentives offered for 
innovation,207 the first law providing a government-sanctioned 
monopoly in return for innovation is generally thought to be the 
Venetian Republic statute of March 19, 1474. The statute 
provided that: 
every person who shall build any new and ingenious device in this 
City, not previously made in our Commonwealth, shall give 
notice . . . when it has been reduced to perfection so that it can be used 
and operated. It being forbidden to every other person in any of our 
territories and towns to make any further device conforming with and 
 
 202 35 USC § 101 (2012). 
 203 A classic example is given in the English case of Darcy v. Allein, 77 Eng. Rep. 
1260 (1602), in which a monopoly was granted over the manufacture of playing cards. 
 204 Sean Carnathan argues that even the U.S. statutory term “first and true 
inventor” as used in contemporary England “included a person who introduced . . . an 
invention previously used in another country.” Sean T. Carnathan, Patent Priority 
Disputes—A Proposed Re-Definition of “First-to-Invent,” 49 ALA. L. REV. 755, 773 (1998). 
 205 See cases cited supra note 199. 
 206 Although by then the U.S. had rejected patents of importation, there are 
elements of the patent statutes which seem to have reflected similar policies. In re Tenney, 
254 F.2d 619, 626 (C.C.P.A. 1958) (noting that § 102’s distinction between domestic and 
foreign knowledge and use showed that it was “readily evident that what Congress was 
concerned with, both in 1836 and 1952, was the probability that the subject matter would 
be made known to the American public. Knowledge and use in the United States would 
probably (or so Congress must have reasoned) become generally known, while the same 
assumption could not be made with respect to such knowledge and use abroad.”). 
 207 Sybaris apparently awarded exclusive rights for one year to creators of new 
recipes. M. Frumkin, The Origin of Patents, 27 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 143, 143 (1945). There 
are records of a patent awarded by the Republic of Florence as early as 1421 (issued to 
Filippo Brunelleschi—the architect of the cathedral of Florence—for a barge with 
hoisting gear). See id. at 144; see also CHRISTINE MACLEOD, INVENTING THE INDUSTRIAL 
REVOLUTION: THE ENGLISH PATENT SYSTEM, 1660–1800, at 11 (2002). 
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similar to said one, without the consent and license of the author, for 
the term of [ten] years.208 
The statute did not require “invention” in the modern sense, but only 
that the claimant “build” a new device; it was intended to motivate 
not only invention, but introduction of inventions from abroad.209 
English practice before the Statute of Monopolies210 
likewise offered a limited term monopoly for inventors and for 
those who were the first to introduce a foreign invention into the 
country.211 Writing in the 19th century, E. Wyndham Hulme 
attempted to catalog the grants of monopolies in the U.K. prior 
to the Statute of Monopolies.212 Among the grants he identifies, 
the May 26, 1562 grant to Cobham for a dredging machine is 
based, not on any evidence that Cobham had invented the 
machine, but rather that “[t]he patentee represent[ed] that ‘by 
diligent travel’ he had discovered a machine to scour the 
entrances to harbours.”213 The patentee was therefore not an 
inventor in the modern statutory sense of the word, but rather 
was rewarded for having observed someone else’s invention 
 
 208 Giulio Mandich, Venetian Patents (1450–1550), 30 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 166, 
177 (1948) (emphasis added). 
 209 “Now, if provision were made for the works and devices discovered by such 
persons, so that others who may see them could not build them and take the inventor’s 
honor away, more men would then apply their genius, would discover, and would build 
devices of great utility and benefit to our commonwealth.” Id. at 176. Note that the 
monopoly was available not only to the actual inventor, but also to the first to bring the 
invention to the territory. 
 210 Statute of Monopolies of 1623, 21 Jac., c. 3, § 6 (Eng.) http://
www.legislation.gov.uk/aep/Ja1/21/3. 
 211 “[I]f a man hath brought in a new invention and a new trade within the 
kingdom . . . or if a man hath made a new discovery of any thing . . . the King . . . may 
grant by charter unto him, that he only shall use such . . . for a certain time.” The 
Clothworkers of Ipswich Case [1615] 78 Eng. Rep. 147, 148 (KB) (emphasis added). As 
Lord Coke explained the rationale and its limits: “[A]t first the people of the kingdom 
are ignorant and have not the knowledge or skill to use it: but when that patent is 
expired, the King cannot make a new grant thereof: for when the trade is become 
common . . . there is no reason that such should be forbidden to use it.” Id. Thus, it was 
held that the Crown might lawfully grant exclusive privileges in a new invention, a new 
discovery, or a new trade within the realm, for a limited time. See id. Modeled on the 
United Kingdom Patent Law of 1852, Jamaica likewise permitted patents of importation. 
See Pfizer, Ltd. v. Medimpex Jam., Ltd. [2014] UKPC 20. Section 3 of the statute provides 
that “[w]henever any person . . . alleg[es] that he hath invented or discovered some new 
and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, not heretofore known or 
used within this Island . . . it shall be lawful for the Governor-General, in the name of 
and on behalf of Her Majesty, to direct Letters Patent, under the Broad Seal of this 
Island, to be issued.” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Jamaica’s Patent Act of 1857) 
Portugal also adopted, by decree in 1892, a law authorizing the grant of patent 
monopolies “for the manufacture of any new industrial products . . . . [with] ‘new 
industry’ . . . defined as one not actually in process of working in the country at the date 
of application.” E. Wyndham Hulme, History of the Patent System Under the Prerogative 
and at Common Law, 12 L. Q. REV. 141, 154 (1896). 
 212 See Hulme, supra note 211, at 141–54. 
 213 Id. at 145. 
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abroad and having been the first to bring it into the country. 
Hulme also reports on a 1571 grant to Richard Dyer “for the 
manufacture of earthen fire-pots, an art which he had learned 
in exile [in Portugal].”214 Again, the patentee did not invent the 
technology, he learned it from others (and was therefore not an 
inventor in the modern statutory sense)—but he introduced it 
into the country. Hulme argues that, even under the Statute of 
Monopolies, which “confined the legitimate exercise of the 
prerogative to the true and first inventor,” the term “inventor” 
as understood at the time was not confined to the mental act of 
invention but was broad enough to cover the first importer of 
technology215 and explains: 
[T]he Crown and Courts alike recognized two classes of 
individuals . . . as the proper recipients of royal favour, (1) the 
bringer-in or importer, (2) the first finder or inventor—the latter 
grounding his title to favourable consideration on the fact that he 
possessed in common with the importer the qualification of 
introducing a new industry within the realm.216 
Support for this rationale for patents of importation is offered by 
The Clothworkers of Ipswich Case: 
[T]he King . . . cannot make a monopoly for that is to take away free-
trade, which is the birthright of every subject. . . . But if a man hath 
brought in a new invention . . . within the kingdom, in peril of his life, 
and consumption of his estate or stock, &c. or if a man hath made a new 
discovery . . . in such cases the King of his grace and favour, in 
recompence . . . may grant . . . that he only shall use such . . . for a 
certain time because at first the people of the kingdom are ignorant. and 
have not the knowledge or skill to use it.217 
The United States itself considered authorizing patents of 
importation,218 an approach that appears to have had the 
 
 214 Id. at 150. 
 215 Id. at 151; see also id. at 151 n.1 (“The connotation of the term ‘inventor’ has 
been unduly restricted. It is used indifferently in these grants with such phrases as ‘the 
first finder out,’ ‘discoverer . . . ’ [etc.]. The word ‘invenio,’ I come upon, denotes primarily 
a physical act rather than a mental process. The Act sought to vest these privileges in 
those who had actually contributed to the introduction of the new art . . . .”). 
 216 Id. at 152. 
 217 The Clothworkers of Ipswich Case [1615], 78 Eng. Rep. 147, 148 (KB); 
Accord In re Edgeberry & Stephens [1691], 91 Eng. Rep. 387, 387 (KB) (holding that the 
term “inventor” in the Statute of Monopolies encompasses the first importer). 
 218 H.R. 41, as originally introduced treated as an inventor the first to import 
an invention “not before known or used within the United States.” H.R. 41, 1st Cong. 
(1790), reprinted in 6 THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS PROJECT, THE DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, MARCH 
4, 1789–MARCH 3, 1791 at 1626–32 (Linda Grant DePauw et al. eds, Johns Hopkins Univ. 
Press 1972) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY]. This section was deleted before 
passage of H. R. 41 as the Patent Statute of 1790. Id. at 1632–37. As originally 
introduced, H.R. 41 (the successor to the prior session’s H.R. 10) added a section 
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support of George Washington,219 but language explicitly 
deeming the first importer as an inventor was deleted from the 
final version of the bill which became the first patent statute.220 
The Patent Act of 1836 was the first to include an explicit 
provision denying a patent if the invention had been described 
in a pre-existing printed publication.221 It distinguished between 
denial based on printed publications and denial based on 
knowledge or use. The statute provided that 
if . . . it shall not appear . . . that the same had been . . . described in any 
printed publication in this or any foreign country, or had been in public 
use or on sale . . . prior to the application, . . . it shall be [the 
Commissioner’s] duty to issue a patent therefor.222 
The underlying rationale for granting patents of 
importation adopted by Queen Elizabeth I was “to stimulate 
domestic production of both raw materials and a wide variety of 
manufactured goods previously imported from abroad.”223 Faced 
with the goal of motivating innovation in order to generate 
revenue, plus the recognition that new worlds were opening and 
those new worlds had domestically unavailable technology, 
these countries adopted the view that importers of such 
technology deserved rewards on a par with those who 
independently developed innovations—the economic benefits to 
the national economy were similar. 
 
expressly providing that the first importer of an invention be treated as if the original 
inventor. That provision was deleted and (as with many early actions related to patent 
law) there is no formal legislative history explaining why. Walterscheid, however, offers 
the possibility that concerns were raised concerning the constitutionality of patents of 
importation. Edward C. Walterscheid, Charting a Novel Course: The Creation of the 
Patent Act of 1790, 25 AIPLA Q. J. 445, 506–09 (1997) [hereinafter Walterscheid, 
Charting a Novel Course]. 
 219 “The advancement of agriculture, commerce and manufactures, by all proper 
means, will not, I trust, need recommendation. But I cannot forbear intimating to you, 
the expediency of giving effectual encouragement as well to the introduction of new and 
useful inventions from abroad, as to the exertions of skill and genius in producing them 
at home . . . .” George Washington “State of the Union” Address (Jan. 8, 1790), reprinted 
in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 251, 253. 
 220 “No copy specifically identified as H.R. 10 has been found, and what is 
known about it comes from indirect sources.” Walterscheid, Charting a Novel Course, 
supra note 218, at 462–63. “Nonetheless, an unidentified typescript of a combined 
copyright and patent bill unearthed at the Library of Congress in 1955 is now considered 
to be H.R. 10, because H.R. 10 is the only known combined bill attempted by the 
Congress.” Id. at 466. 
 221 Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117. 
 222 § 7, 5 Stat. at 119 (emphasis added). 
 223 Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the United States Patent 
Law: Antecedents (Part 2), 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 849, 855 (1994). 
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A similar rationale could apply to extraterrestrial technology 
today.224 The risks and costs of space exploration are enormous, in 
many cases greater than the risks and costs of independent 
development.225 The impacts on the economy are potentially the 
same—the origin of the technology has no effect on its value, except 
with respect to the decision whether to invest in developing the 
technology, and that decision is heavily influenced by the likelihood 
of recovering the costs of development. The availability of patents is 
a major component in evaluating that likelihood. 
The Constitution only authorizes grants of limited term 
monopolies to authors and inventors.226 The question may be raised 
whether patents of importation could fit within that authorization. 
It is tempting to respond that the constitutional line has already 
been crossed with the passage of the AIA, awarding patents to the 
first filer rather than the first inventor. Although many 
commentators argued that this ran afoul of the “authors and 
inventors” requirement,227 Congress thought the AIA 
constitutional. Support can be found in the common understanding 
of the word “invention,” during the formative years of the 
antecedents of U. S. patent law, as including both invention and 
discovery228 (and even the current U.S. patent statute defines 
“invention” as “invention or discovery”).229 The proper inquiry is 
whether the concept furthers national policy, under the conditions 
that prevail at the time. The conditions that prevail today 
regarding space exploration are quite similar to the conditions that 
prevailed in seventeenth and eighteenth century England—there 
are potential resources in locations that will be visited by few and 
only at great risk and expense.230 For the moment, this is an 
appropriate approach to patents, even for “naturally occurring” 
 
 224 For example, Queen Elizabeth’s position vis-a-vis contemporary continental 
Europe can be seen as similar to the current state of terrestrial vis-a-vis extraterrestrial 
technology: there may be technologies in space that would be useful on earth, but significant 
barriers separate the two. Rewards are appropriate for those who surmount those barriers. 
 225 As long as costs were borne by governments, this factor would not matter. 
Now that private entities are venturing into the field and making economic decisions, 
economic motivation does matter. See supra notes 7–12. 
 226 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 227 See discussion supra note 180. 
 228 The standard dictionary of the day would have been Johnson’s Dictionary of 
the English Language, which defined “inventor” as “a [finder] of something not known 
before.” A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1122 (1st ed., 1755), 
https://johnsonsdictionaryonline.com/page-view/?i=1122 [https://perma.cc/2SQ6-P2WV]. 
 229 35 U.S.C. § 100 (2012 & Supp. V 2018) (emphasis added). 
 230 If conditions change, it would certainly be appropriate to change the rules, 
as Congress and the courts have done regarding the definition of prior art in the past. 
See Oppenheimer, In Vento Scribere, supra note 174, at 249–58 (describing the evolution 
of the definition of “printed publication” in response to technological change); see also 
Section III.B., supra. 
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materials discovered in space but previously unknown on earth. 
Like Dyer and his fire-pot, the first party to bring such a substance 
“not heretofore known or used within this Island.”231 Earth should 
be rewarded for the risk and expense of introducing the new 
material to Earth’s storehouse of knowledge. 
As with the other models, there would be a constitutional 
issue regarding patentability of principles of nature—the 
Supreme Court has never been asked to clarify whether only 
natural phenomena that occur on Earth are included.232 This 
model would, however, offer a solution to the novelty issue 
presented under Section 101.233 By allowing “the first to 
introduce” to apply for a patent on a par with “the first inventor 
to file,” and (as required by the AIA) awarding the patent to the 
first to file an application with the USPTO, the model limits the 
technology to one patent. This would, of course, be the result 
under the current system. What the patent of importation model 
adds, however, is the assurance that one of the two applicants will 
receive a patent; under the current system, there is the possibility 
that neither would receive a patent. Instead of inhibiting 
innovation by introducing this risk, it introduces a new element 
of competition—between research and exploration—which should 
lead to greater innovation. In addition, the administrative issues 
discussed in Part IV would be eliminated.234 Because only one 
patent is granted, the patentee would have the power to grant 
exclusive licenses and thereby maintain market control. 
As discussed, there are unresolved issues as to the 
application of Section 102 to prior art from space, particularly the 
date upon which it becomes prior art.235 Giving the “first importer” 
the right to seek a patent would encourage introducing the new 
technology into the prior art at the earliest possible date. Because 
only one patent is to be issued, both an explorer and a researcher 
have an incentive to file an application as soon as possible. 
Therefore, the first to the patent office will presumably be acting 
before anyone else has the invention, and nothing will be withdrawn 
from the public domain. 
As to the inherency issue, the current interpretation should 
adequately protect earthbound innovators. As currently 
 
 231 See Hulme, supra note 211, at 150. Discoveries in space which were already 
known on Earth should not be patentable for the policy reasons discussed supra Section 
III and expressed, for example, in the quoted Jamaican statute cited supra note 211. 
 232 See discussion supra Section III.A. 
 233 See Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 151 U.S. 186, 198 (1984); see also discussion 
supra notes 189–190. 
 234 See supra Section III.C.2. 
 235 See supra Section III.B. 
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interpreted, “[i]nherency . . . may not be established by 
probabilities or possibilities. The mere fact that a certain thing may 
result from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient.”236 Thus, 
if a phenomenon only exists under certain conditions—for example, 
only in the vacuum and extreme temperature of outer space—it 
cannot qualify as inherent. 
By dealing with the issues under 35 U.S.C. § 102, the model 
also deals with those relating to Section 103.237 It also helps 
resolve—or, more accurately, avoid—the questions relating to how 
much the Winslow person of ordinary skill knows.238 By encouraging 
prompt disclosure of information learned in space, the problem of 
whether to include information only known in space is reduced—
once the information is brought to Earth, the problem disappears. 
V. CHOOSING A SOLUTION: PROMOTING INNOVATION BY 
PROTECTING INNOVATORS 
The choice of solution depends on the choice of goals. If 
patents are viewed as anti-competitive in the aggregate, then the 
ideal solution would be one that limited patents to the extent 
possible. Extraterrestrial discoveries, under this view, should be 
available as invalidating prior art to the maximum degree.239 On the 
other hand, if patents are viewed as pro-growth, then the ideal 
solution would be one that gave inventors certainty as to 
expectations should they receive a patent on the theory that the 
patent incentive encourages innovation and that innovation is of 
benefit to society.240 Both views have their adherents.241 
Accepting the constitutional goal of promoting progress (as 
opposed, say, to reducing prices in the short term) by providing 
limited term exclusivity to innovators, a solution should provide a 
sufficient degree of certainty that successful innovation will be 
rewarded. The theory of patent grants as promoters of progress is 
that the marketplace (not the government) will finance innovation  
 236 See In re Robertson, 169 F.3d 743, 745 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (emphasis added) 
(quoting Continental Can Co. v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 237 See supra Section III.C.3. 
 238 See In re Winslow, 365 F.2d 1017, 1020 (C.C.P.A. 1965) (in which the court 
assumed that in determining whether an invention was patentable or not, all relevant 
information was completely known). 
 239 If that is the goal, an even better solution would be to repeal the patent 
statute entirely. 
 240 See Max Stul Oppenheimer, The Innovator’s Dilemma, 4 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 
371, 375 (2015) [hereinafter Oppenheimer, The Innovator’s Dilemma]. 
 241 Any individual patent, viewed in isolation, is clearly anti-competitive—
preventing others from using the claimed technology to compete is the purpose of the 
patent. Viewed in the aggregate, however, it is necessary to also consider the incentive 
to innovate and recall that, absent the innovation represented by the patent, society 
would not have the advance in the first place. 
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by assuring monopoly profits for innovation. To the extent that there 
is doubt regarding the availability of this reward, the incentive to 
innovate is reduced.242 Any solution that introduces new uncertainty 
as to patentability of an invention will reduce the incentive to 
innovate, the ability to finance innovation243 and therefore the 
amount of innovation. 
Any modification of the rules, whether by treaty or by 
statute, introduces uncertainty—new interpretations are required, 
or reaffirmation of existing interpretations to the new rule.244 While 
that is unavoidable, some modifications change uncertainty by 
design, changing the rules to favor or disfavor innovators. 
A resolution must deal with two broad categories of issues: 
treatment of extraterrestrial activity for the purpose of 
establishing the right to a patent, and treatment of extraterrestrial 
activity for the purpose of defeating an existing patent. Viewed 
another way, the resolution must deal with pre-patent activity 
differently than post-patent activity. 
Both discoveries and inventions made in space should be 
eligible for patent protection—they, like any other invention or 
discovery, further progress. Even discoveries—as opposed to 
inventions—in space should be eligible for patent protection if they 
introduce technology not previously available on Earth. Discoveries 
in space should not, however, be allowed to displace previously-
applied for patents—the progress has already been made at the 
point of patent application and if the public did not have access to 
the technology at that point, the applicant has fulfilled the inventor’s 
part of the patent bargain. 
This approach is consistent with the early “patents of 
importation” approach to the opening of new worlds with new 
technology bases. To the extent that it is inconsistent with current 
law, the inconsistency arises, not from constitutional requirement or 
the words of the patent statute, but from judicial interpretation.245 
 
 242 See Oppenheimer, The Innovator’s Dilemma, supra note 240, at 387. 
 243 An investor in research and development is taking the risk that the research 
will actually produce the desired innovation and the risk that the innovation will be 
successful in the marketplace. These are typically large risks—minor innovations are 
generally unpatentable because of the non-obviousness requirement. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012 
& Supp. V 2018). In order to compensate for these risks, there must be a comparably large 
potential for profit and that profit typically can only be protected by patents. 
 244 When the patent statute was amended in 1952 to introduce an explicit 
prohibition on patenting “obvious” inventions—a rule that had been in place through 
judicial interpretation since the 1851 case of Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248, 269 
(1851)—it took a Supreme Court decision to confirm that there was still a prohibition on 
patenting “obvious” inventions, Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966), and 
the contours of “obviousness” remained contentious as recently as 2007. See KSR Int’l 
Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 407 (2007). 
 245 This judicial interpretation has been inconsistent, and has drawn criticism from 
lower courts and the patent office, which argue such interpretation is inconsistent and lacking 
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The approach is also consistent with the path followed by the 
courts in the evolution of the interpretation of the term “printed 
publication” in response to developments in the technology of 
disseminating information. Printed publications were initially 
treated differently from other sources of prior art (knowledge and 
use), on the theory that books traveled more easily and more 
invariably than word of mouth, and initially were limited to ink on 
paper. As communications technology advanced, the meaning of 
“printed publication” expanded to include other forms of 
permanently recorded information and eventually to internet 
publications.246 Similarly, as space travel becomes common, the 
concept of prior art from space can likewise evolve—and if Congress 
believes the evolution is too slow or proceeding in the wrong 
direction, it can amend the statute as it has done with respect to the 
definition of prior art from other countries. 
CONCLUSION 
Current patent law is ill-equipped to deal with an influx of 
technology from outer space. That influx may still be decades in the 
future, so some may argue that it is well to delay changing the patent 
law until there is more information on the challenges actually posed 
by extraterrestrial discoveries. Often it is better to defer statutory 
changes until the impact of a catalyst is well-understood; this 
reduces the risk of overreaction or of reaction to the wrong challenge. 
In this case, however, it is unlikely that the impetus to 
commercialize space exploration will abate, and several problems 
have already been identified (and are unlikely to change). Acting 
now to clarify the potential patent rewards that space exploration 
will offer may, in fact, provide a needed incentive to make the 
enormous investments that such exploration will require. 
Each of the potential solutions analyzed above has its 
advantages and disadvantages—what is an advantage and what is 
a disadvantage depends, of course, on what policy is being pursued, 
but that too is unlikely to change. It is therefore time to begin the 
discussion of how to use the patent system for the purpose it was 
designed for—to encourage progress—by motivating the 
expenditures necessary to search for and exploit what new 
technology might await in outer space. 
 
in theoretical foundation. For a detailed review of the criticism of the Supreme Court’s 
approach to statutory subject matter and an argument that the Court has usurped the 
legislature’s authority, see Oppenheimer, Patents 101, supra note 185, at 44–47. 
 246 For a detailed description of the evolution of the concept of printed 
publication, and a proposal for an approach to handling emerging technologies under 
patent law, see Oppenheimer, In Vento Scribere, supra note 174, at 243–58. 
